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Cited by 371

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 102 of the 102 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Homo Moralis--Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching

·2013·Econometrica
DOI 10.3982/ecta10637
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Abstract

What preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference evolution is driven by the resulting payoffs? We show that when individuals' preferences are their private information, a convex combination of selfishness and morality stands out as evolutionarily stable. We call individuals with such preferences homo moralis. At one end of the spectrum is homo oeconomicus, who acts so as to maximize his or her own payoff. At the opposite end is homo kantiensis, who does what would be “the right thing to do,” in terms of payoffs, if all others would do likewise. We show that the stable degree of morality—the weight placed on the moral goal—is determined by the degree of assortativity in the process whereby individuals are matched to interact.

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Metadata

Venue
Econometrica
Publisher
The Econometric Society
Published
2013
Volume
81
Issue
6
Pages
2269-2302
ISSN
0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.3982/ecta10637
OpenAlex
W2148900998
Cited by
371
References
102
FWCI
54.61
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Homo Moralis--Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3982/ecta10637
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Homo Moralis--Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching. (2013). Econometrica. https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10637

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