The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Theory of Wage Dynamics
Abstract
A dynamic, equilibrium model of long term (implicit) labour contracts under incomplete but symmetric information is developed. Workers are assumed to be risk averse and of unknown ability or productivity. Risk neutral firms learn, as do workers, about each worker's productivity by observing the worker's output over time. It is shown that equilibrium contracts provide for wages which never decline with age and increase only when the worker's market value increases above his current wage. In addition to characterizing the equilibrium wage contract, we also derive some of its implications for the behaviour of aggregate wages across various groups of workers. These implications explain some findings in the recent empirical literature on age-earnings profiles. In particular our model can explain why earnings may be positively related to experience even after controlling for productivity, as some empirical studies have indicated.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Convergence of Probability Measures
Billingsley, P. (1999) · Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics · doi:10.1002/9780470316962 · Cited by 13,910
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Fama, E. F. (1980) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260866 · Cited by 10,466
Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis
Becker, G. S. (1962) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/258724 · Cited by 8,063
Schooling, Experience, and Earnings
Mincer, J. (1974) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 6,840
Becker, G. S. (1983) · Cited by 6,708
Optimal Statistical Decisions.
Siegmund, D., & DeGroot, M. H. (1972) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2284675 · Cited by 3,386
Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover
Jovanovic, B. (1979) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260808 · Cited by 3,092
Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?
Lazear, E. P. (1979) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260835 · Cited by 2,038
Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers
Becker, G. S., & Stigler, G. J. (1974) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/467507 · Cited by 1,843
Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria
Azariadis, C. (1975) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260388 · Cited by 1,262
Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions
Lazear, E. P. (1981) · American Economic Review · Cited by 1,201
Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90073-5 · Cited by 942
Self-citationWages and Employment under Uncertain Demand
Baily, M. N. (1974) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296397 · Cited by 893
Experience, Performance, and Earnings
Medoff, J. L., & Abraham, K. G. (1980) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885488 · Cited by 654
Specific Capital and Labor Turnover
Mortensen, D. T. (1978) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003599 · Cited by 254
Equilibrium Long-Term Labor Contracts
Holmstrom, B. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885374 · Cited by 175
Self-citationRisk Shifting and Reliability in Labor Markets
(1978) · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-03917-3_3 · Cited by 32
Cited by
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Self-citationQuantifying Managerial Ability: A New Measure and Validity Tests
Demerjian, P., Lev, B., & McVay, S. (2012) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1487 · Cited by 1,887
Corporate performance and managerial remuneration
Murphy, K. J. (1985) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(85)90026-6 · Cited by 1,755
Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?
Boot, A. W. A., & Thakor, A. V. (2000) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00223 · Cited by 1,590
The Short- and Long-Term Career Effects of Graduating in a Recession
Oreopoulos, P., von Wachter, T., & Heisz, A. (2012) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.4.1.1 · Cited by 1,256
Metadata
- Authors
- Harris, M., & Holmstrom, B.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1982-07
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 315
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2091391576
- Cited by
- 812
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 27.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.