The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
Open accessAbstract
Consider a long-term relationship between a seller and a buyer whose valuation (for a per-period service or a durable good) is private. As trade progresses, the valuation will be partially revealed, and it may be impossible for the parties to commit ex-ante not to take advantage of this. We analyse this situation first by supposing that the parties can sign a sequence of short-term contracts; and secondly by supposing that they can sign a long-term contract, but cannot commit not to renegotiate it later. We find a close relationship in the second case between the optimal long-term contract and the non-commitment outcome in the standard Coasian durable good model. Our results also have implications for hidden-information principal-agent models.
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Cites
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Selten, R. (1975) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01766400 · Cited by 3,337
Coase, R. H. (1972) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466731 · Cited by 1,571
Bulow, J. I. (1982) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261058 · Cited by 886
Rational Expectations and Durable Goods Pricing
Stokey, N. L. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003511 · Cited by 616
Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect
Freixas, X., Guesnerie, R., & Tirole, J. (1985) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297615 · Cited by 517
Self-citationInfinite-horizon models of bargaining with one-sided incomplete information
Fudenberg, D., Levine, D., & Tirole, J. (1985) · Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528309.006 · Cited by 332
Self-citationA Multistage Model of Bargaining
Sobel, J., & Takahashi, I. (1983) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297673 · Cited by 316
Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship
Baron, D. P., & Besanko, D. A. (1987) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297567 · Cited by 143
Cited by
Goldfarb, A., & Tucker, C. (2019) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20171452 · Cited by 2,744
The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting
Armstrong, C. S., Guay, W. R., & Weber, J. P. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.001 · Cited by 1,494
Acquisti, A., Taylor, C., & Wagman, L. (2016) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.54.2.442 · Cited by 1,283
Conditioning prices on purchase history
Acquisti, A., & Varian, H. R. (2005) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.1040.0103 · Cited by 689
Overcoming Adverse Selection: How Public Intervention Can Restore Market Functioning
Tirole, J. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.1.29 · Cited by 263
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Metadata
- Authors
- Hart, O. D., & Tirole, J.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1988-10
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 509
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2020454534
- Cited by
- 425
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 17.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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