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Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
Abstract
In this paper we consider the problem of implementation when a principal hires many agents and is not able to monitor their actions. We distinguish two cases: (i) when actions are mutually observable among agents, (ii) when actions are not observable at all. In (i), there is a mechanism in which the first-best arises as a unique perfect equilibrium. In (ii), we show by two examples that typically there are multiple equilibria if the principal merely offers a set of optimal sharing rules. However, we prove that the principal can use these optimal sharing rules as a starting point and construct a multi-stage mechanism that has a unique second-best perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
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Citations
Cited by
Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships
Sappington, D. E. M. (1991) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.5.2.45 · Cited by 838
Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations
Itoh, H. (1991) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938221 · Cited by 463
Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect
Ghatak, M. (2000) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00556 · Cited by 416
A crash course in implementation theory
Jackson, M. O. (2001) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/s003550100152 · Cited by 372
Towry, K. L. (2003) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2003.78.4.1069 · Cited by 287
Metadata
- Authors
- Ma, C.-T.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1988-10
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 555
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2026824501
- Cited by
- 169
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 5.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2297405
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- Ma, C.-T. (1988). Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents. The Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297405
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