The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
Abstract
In this paper, we analyze optimal contracts in an infinitely repeated agency model in which both the principal and agent discount the future. We show that there is a stationary representation of the optimal contract when the agent's conditional discounted expected utility is used as a state variable. This representation reduces the multi-period problem to a static variational problem which can be analyzed using standard variational techniques. This reduction is used to obtain several properties of the contract.
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Citations
Cites
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
Optimization by Vector Space Methods
(1970) · Students Quarterly Journal · doi:10.1049/sqj.1970.0088 · Cited by 6,004
The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
Rogerson, W. P. (1985) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913212 · Cited by 868
Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
Abreu, D., Pearce, D., & Stacchetti, E. (1986) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(86)90028-1 · Cited by 665
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Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
Radner, R. (1981) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912747 · Cited by 405
Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
Radner, R. (1985) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911017 · Cited by 382
Long-Term Contracts and Moral Hazard
Lambert, R. A. (1983) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003645 · Cited by 321
Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
Rubinstein, A., & Yaari, M. E. (1983) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90094-7 · Cited by 265
Cited by
Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
Abreu, D., Pearce, D., & Stacchetti, E. (1990) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938299 · Cited by 1,203
Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships
Sappington, D. E. M. (1991) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.5.2.45 · Cited by 838
Moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game
Boot, A. W. A., & Thakor, A. V. (1994) · International Economic Review · doi:10.2307/2527003 · Cited by 827
Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
Kocherlakota, N. R. (1996) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297795 · Cited by 727
A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
SANNIKOV, Y. (2008) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00486.x · Cited by 716
Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous‐Time Agency Model
DeMARZO, P. M., & SANNIKOV, Y. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01002.x · Cited by 637
Consumption Insurance: An Evaluation of Risk-Bearing Systems in Low-Income Economies
Townsend, R. M. (1995) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.9.3.83 · Cited by 601
Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Hopenhayn, H. A., & Nicolini, J. P. (1997) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262078 · Cited by 588
Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
Albuquerque, R., & Hopenhayn, H. A. (2004) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/0034-6527.00285 · Cited by 525
Optimal Long-Term Financial Contracting
DeMarzo, P. M., & Fishman, M. J. (2007) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhm031 · Cited by 431
The composition of international capital flows: risk sharing through foreign direct investment
Albuquerque, R. (2003) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/s0022-1996(03)00013-8 · Cited by 365
Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
Thomas, J., & Worrall, T. (1990) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(90)90023-d · Cited by 362
Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications
BIAIS, B., MARIOTTI, T., PLANTIN, G., & ROCHET, J.-C. (2007) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00425.x · Cited by 360
Dynamic Agency and the q Theory of Investment
DEMARZO, P. M., FISHMAN, M. J., HE, Z., & WANG, N. (2012) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01787.x · Cited by 325
Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
Abreu, D., Milgrom, P., & Pearce, D. (1991) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938286 · Cited by 315
Productivity Shocks, Long-Term Contracts, and Earnings Dynamics
Balke, N., & Lamadon, T. (2022) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20161622 · Cited by 53
Metadata
- Authors
- Spear, S. E., & Srivastava, S.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1987-10
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 599
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1996634090
- Cited by
- 637
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 4.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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