The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race
Abstract
This paper investigates perfect equilibrium in a model of a race in which two players are competing for an indivisible prize. The winner is the first player to reach the finishing line. It is shown that the behaviour of the winner of the race is often exactly as if he were the only player: the rival makes no difference. Even if competition does affect the winner's behaviour, it does so only in the first stage of the race and not thereafter. It is shown how several factors combine to determine which player will win: relative valuations of the prize, discount rates, efficiency at making progress and initial distances from the finishing line. Insofar as the model applies to patent races, it suggests that the potential competition faced by one firm in a patent race (e.g. an incumbent monopolist) may be of little or no consequence.
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Citations
Cites
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Rubinstein, A. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912531 · Cited by 5,264
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Selten, R. (1975) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01766400 · Cited by 3,337
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Cook, P. L., Kamien, M. I., & Schwartz, N. L. (1982) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232689 · Cited by 1,506
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Market Structure and Innovation
Loury, G. C. (1979) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1883165 · Cited by 1,189
Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed of R and D
Dasgupta, P. S., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1980) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.7916/d8pc3c15 · Cited by 770
Market Structure and Innovation: A Reformulation
Lee, T., & Wilde, L. L. (1980) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884551 · Cited by 718
Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit
Selten, R. (1965) · Cited by 559
Reinganum, J. F. (1981) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(81)90015-6 · Cited by 281
The Theory of Technological Competition
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The Economic Design of Sporting Contests
Szymanski, S. (2010) · The Comparative Economics of Sport · doi:10.1057/9780230274273_1 · Cited by 676
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2015) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-014-9421-0 · Cited by 706
Product Introduction with Network Externalities
Katz, M. L., & Shapiro, C. (1992) · The Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.2307/2950627 · Cited by 629
Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the Competition--Innovation Debate?
Gilbert, R. (2006) · Innovation Policy and the Economy · doi:10.1086/ipe.6.25056183 · Cited by 460
The Theory of Business Strategy
Shapiro, C. (1989) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555656 · Cited by 427
Metadata
- Authors
- Harris, C., & Vickers, J.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1985-04
- Volume
- 52
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 193
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2168879783
- Cited by
- 352
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 7.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.