The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incomplete Contracts, Vertical Integration, and Supply Assurance
Abstract
This paper extends the analysis of transactions cost models of vertical integration to multilateral settings. Its main focus is on supply assurance concerns which arise when several downstream firms are competing for inputs in limited supply. Integration reduces supply assurance concerns for an integrating firm but it may increase them for others. Therefore, to explain the scope of any firm, one must consider the overall network of production and distribution relations. Three fundamental questions are addressed: (1) What are the effects of different integration structures?; (2) What are the determinants of the socially efficient integration structures?; (3) In what way do equilibrium integration structures differ from socially efficient structures?
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Citations
Cites
Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors
(1980) · Journal of Sustainable Competitive Intelligence · doi:10.24883/iberoamericanic.v2i2.38 · Cited by 16,592
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism
Dugger, W. M. (1987) · Journal of Economic Issues · doi:10.1080/00213624.1987.11504638 · Cited by 14,786
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261404 · Cited by 9,352
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process
Klein, B., Crawford, R. G., & Alchian, A. A. (1978) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466922 · Cited by 5,791
The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business
Douglass, E. P., & Chandler, A. D. (1978) · The American Historical Review · doi:10.2307/1862020 · Cited by 4,538
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Selten, R. (1975) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01766400 · Cited by 3,337
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling
Binmore, K., Rubinstein, A., & Wolinsky, A. (1986) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555382 · Cited by 2,288
Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
Sutton, J. (1986) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297715 · Cited by 587
Vertical Integration in Competitive Markets Under Uncertainty
Carlton, D. W. (1979) · The Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.2307/2098317 · Cited by 286
Cited by
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Hart, O. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0198288816.001.0001 · Cited by 4,672
General purpose technologies ‘Engines of growth’?
Bresnahan, T. F., & Trajtenberg, M. (1995) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/0304-4076(94)01598-t · Cited by 2,879
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/15.1.74 · Cited by 555
Metadata
- Authors
- Bolton, P., & Whinston, M. D.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1993-01
- Volume
- 60
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 121
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1981264908
- Cited by
- 342
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 27.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.