The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Foreign Direct Investment and the Risk of Expropriation
Open accessAbstract
When an investor, for example a transnational corporation, invests abroad it runs the risk that its investment will be expropriated for the simple reason that international contracts are practically impossible to enforce. Any agreements or contracts then undertaken by the transnational company and the host country must be designed to be self-enforcing. It could be possible for the host country and the transnational corporation to find such self-enforcing agreements if there are future gains from trade. Thus although the host country might have a short-term incentive to expropriate, it has a long-term incentive to foster good relations with potential investors to attract more investment in the future. This conflict between short-term and long-term incentives determines the type of investment contracts agreed. This paper extends previous work on the general underprovision of investment when contracts are incomplete or only partially enforceable (see e.g. Grout (1984)) to a dynamic context. It is likewise shown that investment is initially underprovided but it increases over time and for certain parameter values it tends to the efficient level. The expected future discounted returns to the transnational company decline over time, extending Vernon's observation of the obsolescing bargain (Vernon (1971)). The model is also extended to allow for capital accumulation and consideration is given to renegotiation-proof contracts.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Hart, O. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0198288816.001.0001 · Cited by 4,672
Jensen, N. M. (2003) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818303573040 · Cited by 1,017
Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
Albuquerque, R., & Hopenhayn, H. A. (2004) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/0034-6527.00285 · Cited by 525
Democracy, Autocracy, and Expropriation of Foreign Direct Investment
Li, Q. (2009) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414009331723 · Cited by 400
The composition of international capital flows: risk sharing through foreign direct investment
Albuquerque, R. (2003) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/s0022-1996(03)00013-8 · Cited by 365
Metadata
- Authors
- Thomas, J., & Worrall, T.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1994-01-01
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 81-108
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W1597204353
- Cited by
- 363
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 37.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Foreign Direct Investment and the Risk of Expropriation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2297878
- The paper
- Thomas, J., & Worrall, T. (1994). Foreign Direct Investment and the Risk of Expropriation. The Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297878
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.