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Cited by 601

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Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts

Open access
Stole, Lars A., Zwiebel, Jeffrey·1996·The Review of Economic Studies
DOI 10.2307/2297888
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Abstract

We present a new methodology for studying the problem of intra-firm bargaining, based on the notion that contracts cannot commit the firm and its agents to wages and employment. We develop and analyse a general non-cooperative multilateral bargaining framework between the firm and its employees and consider outcomes which are immune to renegotiations by any party. Equilibrium firm profits are characterizable as both a weighted average of a neo-classical (non-bargaining) firm's profits and a generalization of Shapley value for a corresponding cooperative game. Furthermore, the resulting payoffs induce economically significant distortions in the firm's input and organizational-design decisions.

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Metadata

Authors
Stole, L. A., & Zwiebel, J.
Venue
The Review of Economic Studies
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
1996-07
Volume
63
Issue
3
Pages
375
ISSN
0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.2307/2297888
OpenAlex
W1419439789
Cited by
601
References
0
FWCI
15.10
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2297888
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Stole, L. A., & Zwiebel, J. (1996). Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts. The Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297888

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.