The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts
Open accessAbstract
We present a new methodology for studying the problem of intra-firm bargaining, based on the notion that contracts cannot commit the firm and its agents to wages and employment. We develop and analyse a general non-cooperative multilateral bargaining framework between the firm and its employees and consider outcomes which are immune to renegotiations by any party. Equilibrium firm profits are characterizable as both a weighted average of a neo-classical (non-bargaining) firm's profits and a generalization of Shapley value for a corresponding cooperative game. Furthermore, the resulting payoffs induce economically significant distortions in the firm's input and organizational-design decisions.
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Cites
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Job Search and Labor Market AnalysisPreprint
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Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-up Problem
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Inequality and Economic Growth: The Perspective of the New Growth Theories
Aghion, P., Caroli, E., & García-Peñalosa, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.4.1615 · Cited by 1,848
Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (1998) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355398555630 · Cited by 1,123
Inequality and Unemployment in a Global Economy
(2010) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta8640 · Cited by 898
Firm‐Specific Human Capital: A Skill‐Weights Approach
Lazear, E. P. (2009) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/648671 · Cited by 638
Labour Market Rigidities, Trade and Unemployment
HELPMAN, E., & ITSKHOKI, O. (2010) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2010.00600.x · Cited by 492
Metadata
- Authors
- Stole, L. A., & Zwiebel, J.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1996-07
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 375
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1419439789
- Cited by
- 601
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 15.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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