The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Entry in Monopoly Markets
Abstract
This paper develops new empirical models of market concentration from game-theoretic models of entry. We construct our models from inequality conditions that describe entrants' equilibrium strategies in simultaneous-move and sequential-move games, and use them to study the effects of entry in isolated monopoly markets for new automobiles. From estimates of the market size necessary to support one and two dealers, we conclude that monopoly dealers do not block the entry of a second dealer. We also find that entry does not cause price-cost margins to fall by much.
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Citations
Cites
Entry, industry growth, and the microdynamics of industry supply
Hause, J. C., & Du Rietz, G. (1984) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261254 · Cited by 121
Cited by
Chapter 17 Empirical studies of industries with market power
Bresnahan, T. F. (1989) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(89)02005-4 · Cited by 1,271
Self-citationThe Effects of Entry on Incumbent Innovation and Productivity
Aghion, P., Blundell, R., Griffith, R., Howitt, P., & Prantl, S. (2009) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest.91.1.20 · Cited by 1,071
Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games
Aguirregabiria, V., & Mira, P. (2007) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00731.x · Cited by 704
An empirical model of firm entry with endogenous product-type choices
Seim, K. (2006) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00034.x · Cited by 655
What Happens When Wal-Mart Comes to Town: An Empirical Analysis of the Discount Retailing Industry
(2008) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta6649 · Cited by 655
Metadata
- Authors
- Bresnahan, T. F., & Reiss, P. C.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1990-10
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 531
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1973723299
- Cited by
- 524
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 8.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.