The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Entry in Monopoly Markets
Abstract
This paper develops new empirical models of market concentration from game-theoretic models of entry. We construct our models from inequality conditions that describe entrants' equilibrium strategies in simultaneous-move and sequential-move games, and use them to study the effects of entry in isolated monopoly markets for new automobiles. From estimates of the market size necessary to support one and two dealers, we conclude that monopoly dealers do not block the entry of a second dealer. We also find that entry does not cause price-cost margins to fall by much.
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Citations
Cites
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Chapter 17 Empirical studies of industries with market power
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Self-citationThe Effects of Entry on Incumbent Innovation and Productivity
Aghion, P., Blundell, R., Griffith, R., Howitt, P., & Prantl, S. (2009) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest.91.1.20 · Cited by 1,071
Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games
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An empirical model of firm entry with endogenous product-type choices
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Self-citationThe Industrial Organization of Health-Care Markets
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Modeling Lane-Changing Behavior in a Connected Environment: A Game Theory Approach
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Identification and Estimation of a Discrete Game of Complete Information
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The Effects of Entry on Incumbent Innovation and Productivity
Aghion, P., Blundell, R., Griffith, R., Howitt, P., & Prantl, S. (2006) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w12027 · Cited by 271
Competition and Structure in Serial Supply Chains with Deterministic Demand
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Do increasing markups matter? Lessons from empirical industrial organization
Berry, S., Gaynor, M., & Morton, F. S. (2019) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.33.3.44 · Cited by 235
Microeconometrics with partial identification
(2020) · Handbook of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/bs.hoe.2020.05.002 · Cited by 99
Metadata
- Authors
- Bresnahan, T. F., & Reiss, P. C.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1990-10
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 531
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1973723299
- Cited by
- 524
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 8.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.