The DOI matches its OpenAlex record.
Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital
Abstract
This paper examines the structure of staged venture capital investments when agency and monitoring costs exist. Expected agency costs increase as assets become less tangible, growth options increase, and asset specificity rises. Data from a random sample of 794 venture capital-backed firms support the predictions. Venture capitalists concentrate investments in early stage and high technology companies where informational asymmetries are highest. Decreases in industry ratios of tangible assets to total assets, higher market-to-book ratios, and greater R&D intensities lead to more frequent monitoring. Venture capitalists periodically gather information and maintain the option to discontinue funding projects with little probability of going public.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth
Audretsch, D. B., Keilbach, M. C., & Lehmann, E. E. (2006) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183511.001.0001 · Cited by 1,370
Grandstanding in the venture capital industry
Gompers, P. A. (1996) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(96)00874-4 · Cited by 1,347
Self-citationGans, J. S., & Stern, S. (2003) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/s0048-7333(02)00103-8 · Cited by 1,294
Stuart, T., & Sorenson, O. (2003) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/s0048-7333(02)00098-7 · Cited by 910
Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency
Fung, A., Graham, M., & Weil, D. (2007) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510533 · Cited by 752
Metadata
- Authors
- Gompers, P. A.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1995-12-01
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1461-1461
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123828214
- Cited by
- 475
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 36.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2329323
- The paper
- Gompers, P. A. (1995). Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.2307/2329323
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
