The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments
Abstract
Anup Agrawal, Gershon N. Mandelker, Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Jun., 1990), pp. 143-161
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Citations
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Corporate Governance, Idiosyncratic Risk, and Information Flow
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Do occupational pension funds monitor companies in which they hold large stakes?
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Undoing the powerful anti-takeover force of staggered boards
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Metadata
- Authors
- Agrawal, A., & Mandelker, G. N.
- Venue
- The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1990-06
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 143
- ISSN
- 0022-1090 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2164323143
- Cited by
- 569
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 22.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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