Undoing the powerful anti-takeover force of staggered boards
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Classified Boards, the Cost of Debt, and Firm PerformancePreprint
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The dynamics of corporate governance: Changes in contractual relations
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Shareholder Activism in India: A Review and Research Agenda
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Shareholder Democracy as a Misbegotten Metaphor
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How powerful CEOs adopt antitakeover provisions?
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Staggered Boards and Private Benefits of ControlPreprint
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The Wealth Effect of Adopting Anti-Takeover Defences: Evidence from a Meta AnalysisPreprint
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Staggered Boards, Innovation, and Firm Life Cycle
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- Authors
- Guo, R.-J., Kruse, T. A., & Nohel, T.
- Affiliations
- University of Illinois Chicago (US)
- Xavier University (US)
- Loyola University Chicago (US)
- Corresponding author
- Nohel, Tom
- Venue
- Journal of Corporate Finance
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2008-06
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 274-288
- ISSN
- 0929-1199 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122503504
- Cited by
- 113
- References
- 54
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 2 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 7 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 7 · 2012: 9
- FWCI
- 27.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Journal of Corporate Finance (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Law
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
- Keywords
- staggered boards, takeover defenses, shareholder activism, corporate governance, shareholder wealth effects, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, takeover targets, investor reaction
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