The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Repurchase Tender Offers, Signaling, and Managerial Incentives
Abstract
One of the main principles of corporate finance is that managers should maximize the market value of the outstanding securities. While it is realized that managers and security holders may have divergent objectives, it is generally assumed that various market forces keep managerial and shareholders' goals in line. Out of the extensive literature on this issue, three such market forces emerge. First, non-value-maximizing firms are prime targets for take-over bids (e.g., see [14]): bidding firms could acquire control over the shares of the target firm, replace the management, follow a value-maximizing strategy, and realize a profit from the resulting appeciation of the target shares. Second, outside shareholders may charge managers-owners ex ante by discounting stock prices for expected managerial expropriation, which may induce managers to accept various restrictions on their behavior (e.g., see [11]). Third, shareholders may charge managers ex post, indirectly via the discipline imposed by a competitive managerial labor market (e.g., [8]). Note the difference from the previous mechanism: Jensen and Meckling [11] assume that managerial wages are fixed so that all the adjustment for expected expropriation is reflected in stock prices (and, ultimately, in costly monitoring and bonding devices). In Fama's [8] model, all the adjustment occurs in the managerial labor market, so that the value of the firm remains unaffected by expected managerial expropriation.
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Citations
Cites
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The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive‐Signalling Approach,
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Cited by
Masulis, R. W., & Korwar, A. N. (1986) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(86)90051-6 · Cited by 894
The Information Content of Share Repurchase Programs
Grullon, G., & Michaely, R. (2004) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00645.x · Cited by 823
COMMENT, R., & JARRELL, G. A. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04617.x · Cited by 616
On the Importance of Measuring Payout Yield: Implications for Empirical Asset Pricing
BOUDOUKH, J., MICHAELY, R., RICHARDSON, M., & ROBERTS, M. R. (2007) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01226.x · Cited by 604
Corporate payout policy and managerial stock incentives
Fenn, G. W., & Liang, N. (2001) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00039-3 · Cited by 559
OFER, A. R., & THAKOR, A. V. (1987) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb02572.x · Cited by 435
Anomalous Price Behavior Around Repurchase Tender Offers
LAKONISHOK, J., & VERMAELEN, T. (1990) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb03698.x · Cited by 400
Self-citationAllen, F., & Michaely, R. (2003) · Handbook of the Economics of Finance · doi:10.1016/s1574-0102(03)01011-2 · Cited by 374
Insider Trading around Dividend Announcements: Theory and Evidence
JOHN, K., & LANG, L. H. P. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04621.x · Cited by 372
Shareholder Preferences and Dividend Policy
BRENNAN, M. J., & THAKOR, A. V. (1990) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb02424.x · Cited by 360
Optimal Investment with Stock Repurchase and Financing as Signals
Constantinides, G. M., & Grundy, B. D. (1989) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/2.4.445 · Cited by 291
Asymmetric Information and Dividend Policy
Li, K., & Zhao, X. (2008) · Financial Management · doi:10.1111/j.1755-053x.2008.00030.x · Cited by 281
Dutch Auction Repurchases: An Analysis of Shareholder Heterogeneity
BAGWELL, L. S. (1992) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb03979.x · Cited by 271
Metadata
- Authors
- Vermaelen, T.
- Venue
- The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1984-06
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 163
- ISSN
- 0022-1090 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2156315985
- Cited by
- 252
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 12.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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