Self-Selection and the Pricing of Bank Services: An Analysis of the Market for Loan Commitments and the Role of Compensating Balance Requirements
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The idea that various characteristics of financial contracts and institutions can be explained as a rational response to problems created by information asymmetries has received a great deal of attention recently. A central theme of the literature in this area is that while moral hazard may hamper the direct transfer of information between market participants, information may be conveyed indirectly through the actions of market participants. For example, the characteristics of the insurance contract purchased may convey information as to riskiness of the insured. Recognition of the possible effects of information asymmetries has provided valuable insights into the role of financial intermediaries and the characteristics of the contracts they offer. In this paper we apply this literature to an analysis of the market for bank loan commitments. Through our analysis we are able to explain the use of various payment options such as fees and compensating balance requirements associated with loan commitments. Extensions of our analysis into the pricing of other bank services are also explored.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive‐Signalling Approach,
Ross, S. A. (1977) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003485 · Cited by 4,168
Cited by
Berger, A. N., & Bouwman, C. H. S. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn104 · Cited by 1,295
Trade Credit and Informational Asymmetry
SMITH, J. K. (1987) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb03916.x · Cited by 880
Competition, risk neutrality and loan commitments
Boot, A., Thakor, A. V., & Udell, G. F. (1987) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/0378-4266(87)90043-4 · Cited by 170
Loan commitment contracts, terms of lending, and credit allocation
MELNIK, A., & PLAUT, S. (1986) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb05046.x · Cited by 161
An economic rationale for the pricing structure of bank loan commitments
Thakor, A. V., & Udell, G. F. (1987) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/0378-4266(87)90053-7 · Cited by 92
Metadata
- Authors
- James, C.
- Venue
- The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1981-12
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 725
- ISSN
- 0022-1090 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2066648863
- Cited by
- 29
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 1.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.