The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders
Abstract
Anup Agrawal, Charles R. Knoeber, Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Sep., 1996), pp. 377-397
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Management ownership and market valuation
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90048-7 · Cited by 6,895
The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences
Demsetz, H., & Lehn, K. (1985) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261354 · Cited by 6,236
The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice
TITMAN, S., & WESSELS, R. (1988) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb02585.x · Cited by 6,112 · cited 1×
“Many of 1Following Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) and Titman and Wessels (1988), we also added other explanatory variables to (6).”
BackgroundAdditional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value
McConnell, J. J., & Servaes, H. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90069-c · Cited by 4,309
On the Existence of an Optimal Capital Structure: Theory and Evidence
BRADLEY, M., JARRELL, G. A., & KIM, E. H. (1984) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03680.x · Cited by 2,473
The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1991) · Financial Management · doi:10.2307/3665716 · Cited by 2,309
Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth
Rosenstein, S., & Wyatt, J. G. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90002-h · Cited by 1,929
Does corporate performance improve after mergers?
Healy, P. M., Palepu, K. G., & Ruback, R. S. (1992) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(92)90002-f · Cited by 1,659
Executive incentives and the horizon problem
Dechow, P. M., & Sloan, R. G. (1991) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0167-7187(91)90058-s · Cited by 1,548
The Determinants of Board Composition
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1988) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555459 · Cited by 1,472
Tobin's $q$ Ratio and Industrial Organization
Lindenberg, E. B., & Ross, S. A. (1981) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296120 · Cited by 1,376
Palepu, K. G. (1986) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(86)90008-x · Cited by 1,308
Simultaneous Determination of Insider Ownership, Debt, and Dividend Policies
Jensen, G. R., Solberg, D. P., & Zorn, T. S. (1992) · The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/2331370 · Cited by 1,064
Merger bids, uncertainty, and stockholder returns
Asquith, P. (1983) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(83)90005-3 · Cited by 922
Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment
Hubbard, R. G. (1990) · University of Chicago Press eBooks · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226355948.001.0001 · Cited by 679
Alternative constructions of Tobin's q: An empirical comparison
Perfect, S. B., & Wiles, K. W. (1994) · Journal of Empirical Finance · doi:10.1016/0927-5398(94)90007-8 · Cited by 490
The Effect of Executive Stock Option Plans on Stockholders and Bondholders
DeFUSCO, R. A., JOHNSON, R. R., & ZORN, T. S. (1990) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb03707.x · Cited by 489
Antitakeover charter amendments and stockholder wealth
DeAngelo, H., & Rice, E. M. (1983) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(83)90016-8 · Cited by 475
On Finite Sample Distributions of Generalized Classical Linear Identifiability Test Statistics
Basmann, R. L. (1960) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.1080/01621459.1960.10483365 · Cited by 473
Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences
Thistle, P. D., & Auerbach, A. J. (1989) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1059508 · Cited by 436
Shark repellents and stock prices
Jarrell, G. A., & Poulsen, A. B. (1987) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(87)90032-8 · Cited by 407
Malatesta, P. H., & Walkling, R. A. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90050-5 · Cited by 366
The effect of poison pill securities on shareholder wealth
Ryngaert, M. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90051-7 · Cited by 363
The wealth effects of second-generation state takeover legislation
Karpoff, J. M., & Malatesta, P. H. (1989) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(89)90085-8 · Cited by 323
The Impact of Managerial Ownership on Acquisition Attempts and Target Shareholder Wealth
Song, M. H., & Walkling, R. A. (1993) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/2331159 · Cited by 308
An empirical investigation of the impact of ‘antitakeover’ amendments on common stock prices
Linn, S. C., & McConnell, J. J. (1983) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(83)90017-x · Cited by 294
Golden parachutes, executive decision-making, and shareholder wealth
Lambert, R. A., & Larcker, D. F. (1985) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(85)90036-9 · Cited by 277
Dual-class recapitalizations as antitakeover mechanisms
Jarrell, G. A., & Poulsen, A. B. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90042-6 · Cited by 235
Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents, and Hostile Tender Offers
Knoeber, C. R. (1986) · American Economic Review · Cited by 196
Self-citationThe creation of a class of limited voting common stock and shareholder wealth
Partch, M. M. (1987) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(87)90043-2 · Cited by 155
Cited by
Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value
Carter, D. A., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. (2003) · Financial Review · doi:10.1111/1540-6288.00034 · Cited by 3,353
Boards: Does one size fit all☆
COLES, J., DANIEL, N., & NAVEEN, L. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.08.008 · Cited by 3,075
Endogeneity and the dynamics of internal corporate governance
Wintoki, M. B., Linck, J. S., & Netter, J. M. (2012) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.03.005 · Cited by 3,005
Himmelberg, C. P., Hubbard, R. G., & Palia, D. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00025-2 · Cited by 2,500
Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Financial Performance
Campbell, K., & Mínguez-Vera, A. (2008) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-007-9630-y · Cited by 2,209
Metadata
- Authors
- Agrawal, A., & Knoeber, C. R.
- Venue
- The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1996-09
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 377
- ISSN
- 0022-1090 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123504461
- Cited by
- 2,801
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 107.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.