The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance
Abstract
This paper attempts to measure difference in firm performance caused by broad composition and ownership structure. These two variables are intended to measure the direct incentives and monitoring faced by top management. We also control for a number of otheк variables that are likely to be correlated with corporate performance. We do so to improve the precision of our estimates, as well as to eliminate much of the omitted-variable bias that has undoubtedly affected previous studies of board composition.
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Citations
Cites
Specification Tests in Econometrics
Hausman, J. A. (1978) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913827 · Cited by 18,820
Cited by
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(98)00058-0 · Cited by 4,335
Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2001) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530152466269 · Cited by 1,740
Frydman, C., & Jenter, D. (2010) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-120209-133958 · Cited by 542
Metadata
- Authors
- Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S.
- Venue
- Financial Management
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1991
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 101
- ISSN
- 0046-3892 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1977528366
- Cited by
- 2,309
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 20.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1 (tdm, 9009 d)
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- Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1991). The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance. Financial Management. https://doi.org/10.2307/3665716
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
