The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Forward Contracts and Firm Value: Investment Incentive and Contracting Effects
Abstract
Corporate risk hedging with forward contracts increases value by reducing incentives to underinvest. This occurs because the hedge decreases the sensitivity of senior claim value to incremental investment, allowing equity holders to capture a larger portion of the incremental benefit from new investment. Hedging also allows the firm to credibly commit to meet obligations in states where it otherwise could not, which improves contract terms the firm can negotiate with customers, creditors, and managers. These benefits cannot be duplicated by individual hedging, and each result holds independent of agents' risk preferences.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Determinants of corporate borrowing
Myers, S. C. (1977) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(77)90015-0 · Cited by 13,169
Cited by
On the Determinants of Corporate Hedging
NANCE, D. R., SMITH, C. W., & SMITHSON, C. W. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04709.x · Cited by 1,254
Does hedging affect firm value? Evidence from the US airline industry
Carter, D. A., Rogers, D. A., & Simkins, B. J. (2006) · Financial Management · doi:10.1111/j.1755-053x.2006.tb00131.x · Cited by 389
Empirical Evidence on the Corporate Use of Derivatives
Berkman, H., & Bradbury, M. E. (1996) · Financial Management · doi:10.2307/3665985 · Cited by 300
Metadata
- Authors
- Bessembinder, H.
- Venue
- The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1991-12
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 519
- ISSN
- 0022-1090 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2116717227
- Cited by
- 453
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 8.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Forward Contracts and Firm Value: Investment Incentive and Contracting Effects. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2331409
- The paper
- Bessembinder, H. (1991). Forward Contracts and Firm Value: Investment Incentive and Contracting Effects. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. https://doi.org/10.2307/2331409
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
