The DOI matches its Crossref record; the references it cites are not checked yet.
Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans
Abstract
Evaluating organizations according to an efficiency criterion would make it possible to predict the form organizations will take under certain conditions. Organization theory has not developed such a criterion because it has lacked a conceptual scheme capable of describing organizational efficiency in sufficiently microsopic terms. The transactions cost approach provides such a framework because it allows us to identify the conditions which give rise to the costs of mediating exchanges between individuals: goal incongruence and performance ambiguity. Different combinations of these causes distinguish three basic mechanisms of mediation or control: markets, which are efficient when performance ambiguity is low and goal incongruence is high; bureaucracies, which are efficient when both goal incongruence and performance ambiguity are moderately high; and clans, which are efficient when goal incongruence is low and performance ambiguity is high.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Citations
The citation lists haven’t been fetched yet
References 27 · Cited by 4,735
Metadata
- Authors
- Ouchi, W. G.
- Corresponding author
- Ouchi, William G.
- Venue
- Administrative Science Quarterly
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1980-03
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 129
- ISSN
- 0001-8392 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2079414640
- Cited by
- 4,735
- References
- 27
- Citations by year
- 2026: 31 · 2025: 47 · 2024: 62 · 2023: 109 · 2022: 97 · 2021: 178 · 2020: 186 · 2019: 149 · 2018: 121 · 2017: 150 · 2016: 121 · 2015: 162 · 2014: 187 · 2013: 166 · 2012: 186
- FWCI
- 30.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Administrative Science Quarterly (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Management Information Systems › Outsourcing and Supply Chain Management
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Management Theory and Practice
- Keywords
- transaction cost economics, organizational efficiency, markets, bureaucracy, clans, goal incongruence, mediating mechanisms, organizational forms, goal alignment
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2392231
- The paper
- Ouchi, W. G. (1980). Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans. Administrative Science Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.2307/2392231
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.