The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Power and Managerial Dismissal: Scapegoating at the Top
Abstract
Warren Boeker Columbia University A study of 67 organizations over a 22-year period is used to examine the likelihood of chief executive and top management dismissal as a result of organizational performance and the distribution of power in the organization. Powerful chief executives are found to be less likely than less powerful chief executives to be dismissed during performance downturns. Instead, they displace blame for poor performance onto their subordinates, the top managers of the organization, who subsequently are replaced, while the chief executive remains. The paper examines the role that board composition and organization ownership play in influencing the amount of power the chief executive is likely to possess and explores what actions organizations with poor performance but powerful chief executives might take.'
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Cited by
Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. (1999) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/210361 · Cited by 3,232
Meta-analytic reviews of board composition, leadership structure, and financial performance
Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Ellstrand, A. E., & Johnson, J. L. (1998) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(199803)19:3<269::aid-smj950>3.0.co;2-k · Cited by 2,324
NUMBER OF DIRECTORS AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: A META-ANALYSIS.
Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L., & Ellstrand, A. E. (1999) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256988 · Cited by 1,764
Chapter 38 Executive compensation
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Boards of directors: A review and research agenda
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Metadata
- Authors
- Boeker, W.
- Venue
- Administrative Science Quarterly
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1992-09
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 400
- ISSN
- 0001-8392 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2015541788
- Cited by
- 646
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 48.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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