The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Director Reputation, CEO-Board Power, and the Dynamics of Board Interlocks
Open accessAbstract
This study advances research on CEO-board relationships, interlocking directorates, and director reputation by examining how contests for intraorganizational power can affect interorganizational ties. We propose that powerful top managers seek to maintain their control by selecting and retaining board members with experience on other, passive boards and excluding individuals with experience on more active boards. We also propose that powerful boards similarly seek to maintain their control by favoring directors with a reputation for more actively monitoring management and avoiding directors with experience on passive boards. Hypotheses are tested longitudinally using CEO-board data taken from 491 of the largest U.S. corporations over a recent seven-year period. The findings suggest that variation in CEO-board power relationships across organizations has contributed to a segmentation of the corporate director network. We discuss how our perspective can reconcile contrary views and debates on whether increased board control has diffused across large U.S. corporations.(.)
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The pricing of options and corporate liabilities
Black, F., & Scholes, M. (1973) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260062 · Cited by 29,074
Cited by
The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey
Adams, R. B., Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.1.58 · Cited by 2,358
Board Composition: Balancing Family Influence in S&P 500 Firms
Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. (2004) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/4131472 · Cited by 1,154
Bourdieu and organizational analysis
Emirbayer, M., & Johnson, V. (2008) · Theory and Society · doi:10.1007/s11186-007-9052-y · Cited by 924
Boardroom Diversity and its Effect on Social Performance: Conceptualization and Empirical Evidence
Hafsi, T., & Turgut, G. (2013) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-012-1272-z · Cited by 758
The Small World of the American Corporate Elite, 1982-2001
Davis, G. F., Yoo, M., & Baker, W. E. (2003) · Strategic Organization · doi:10.1177/14761270030013002 · Cited by 728
Metadata
- Authors
- Zajac, E. J., & Westphal, J. D.
- Venue
- Administrative Science Quarterly
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1996-09
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 507
- ISSN
- 0001-8392 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1974928497
- Cited by
- 471
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 20.99
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Director Reputation, CEO-Board Power, and the Dynamics of Board Interlocks. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2393940
- The paper
- Zajac, E. J., & Westphal, J. D. (1996). Director Reputation, CEO-Board Power, and the Dynamics of Board Interlocks. Administrative Science Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.2307/2393940
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.