The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Trade Associations as Information Exchange Mechanisms
Abstract
This article examines the incentives of firms competing in an oligopolistic industry to share information about an unknown demand parameter when such sharing takes place on a quid pro quo basis. The model predicts that if total cost functions are sufficiently convex, information sharing (such as through a trade association) is Pareto-preferred to a setting of private information and forms a Nash equilibrium. Expected consumer surplus also always increases when information is shared.
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Citations
Cited by
LEUZ, C., & WYSOCKI, P. D. (2016) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12115 · Cited by 1,760
Henriques, I., & Sadorsky, P. (1999) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/256876 · Cited by 1,327
Information sharing in a supply chain
Lee, H. L., & Whang, S. (2000) · International Journal of Manufacturing Technology and Management · doi:10.1504/ijmtm.2000.001329 · Cited by 980
Leuz, C., & Wysocki, P. D. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1105398 · Cited by 690
Insider Trading and the Efficiency of Stock Prices
Fishman, M. J., & Hagerty, K. M. (1992) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555435 · Cited by 453
Metadata
- Authors
- Kirby, A. J.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1988
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 138
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2010793706
- Cited by
- 202
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 4.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Trade Associations as Information Exchange Mechanisms. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2555403
- The paper
- Kirby, A. J. (1988). Trade Associations as Information Exchange Mechanisms. The RAND Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/2555403
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.