The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Determinants of Board Composition
Abstract
We identify factors that lead to changes among corporate directors. We hypothesize that the CEO succession process and firm performance will affect board composition. Our findings are consistent with both hypotheses. When their CEO nears retirement, firms tend to add inside directors (who may be possible candidates to be the next CEO) Just after a CEO change, inside directors with short tenures appear more likely to leave the board (they, perhaps, being the losing candidates). We also find that inside directors are more likely to leave the board and outside directors more likely to join after a firm performs poorly and when a firm leaves a product market.
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Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Separation of Ownership and Control
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,058
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261385 · Cited by 8,408
Outside directors and CEO turnover
Weisbach, M. S. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90053-0 · Cited by 4,234
Self-citationEconometric Models for Count Data with an Application to the Patents-R & D Relationship
Hausman, J., Hall, B. H., & Griliches, Z. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911191 · Cited by 3,393
Stock prices and top management changes
Warner, J. B., Watts, R. L., & Wruck, K. H. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90054-2 · Cited by 1,568
Mace, M. L. (1971) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,481
(2007) · Financial Management for Hospitality Decision Makers · doi:10.4324/9780080506456-11 · Cited by 1,022
Éliade, M. (1963) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 606
Passing the Baton: Managing the Process of CEO Succession
Vancil, R. F. (1987) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 545
Cited by
Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors
Yermack, D. (1996) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(95)00844-5 · Cited by 6,603
Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance☆
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2009) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.10.007 · Cited by 5,711
Outside directors and CEO turnover
Weisbach, M. S. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90053-0 · Cited by 4,234
Self-citation(1997) · CFA Digest · doi:10.2469/dig.v27.n2.79 · Cited by 3,518
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Metadata
- Authors
- Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1988
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 589
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2067879024
- Cited by
- 1,472
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 16.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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