The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Theory of Yardstick Competition
Abstract
In the typical regulatory scheme a franchised monopoly has little incentive to reduce costs. This article proposes a mechanism in which the price the regulated firm receives depends on the costs of identical firms. In equilibrium each firm chooses a socially efficient level of cost reduction. The mechanism generalizes to cover heterogeneous firms with observable differences. Medicare's prospective reimbursement of hospitals by using diagnostically related groups is a scheme very similar to the one outlined here.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Lazear, E. P., & Rosen, S. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261010 · Cited by 4,560
Prices and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition
Stiglitz, J. E., & Nalebuff, B. (1983) · The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science · doi:10.7916/d87h1v6s · Cited by 975
Information, Competition, and Markets
Stiglitz, J. E., & Nalebuff, B. (1983) · American Economic Review · doi:10.7916/d83b6946 · Cited by 358
The control of natural monopolies
Schmalensee, R. (1979) · Cited by 114
Bailey, E. E. (1974) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(74)90016-4 · Cited by 60
Cited by
Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources
STEIN, J. C. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03810.x · Cited by 1,777
The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization
Treisman, D. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511619151 · Cited by 800
Incumbent Behavior: Vote Seeking, Tax Setting and Yardstick Competition
Besley, T., & Case, A. (1992) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w4041 · Cited by 766
The Price Ain’t Right? Hospital Prices and Health Spending on the Privately Insured*
Cooper, Z., Craig, S. V., Gaynor, M., & Van Reenen, J. (2019) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjy020 · Cited by 575
Industrial Organization: A Strategic Approach
Church, J., & Ware, R. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5366237 · Cited by 541
Metadata
- Authors
- Shleifer, A.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1985
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 319
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2145277151
- Cited by
- 1,413
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 13.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.