Cited by 191Merger and Competition AnalysisRegulation and Compliance StudiesLegal and Constitutional Studies

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Good Regulatory Regimes

Schmalensee, Richard·1989·The RAND Journal of Economics

Abstract

Assuming simple functional forms, numerical methods are used to analyze linear regulatory rules that include cost-plus and price-cap regimes. Regulators are assumed to observe actual cost, but not the disutility of cost reduction, and are assumed unable to impose taxes or make transfers. Best linear regimes depend importantly on the level and form of uncertainty, the regulatory objective function, and the firm profitability constraint. Under uncertainty, regimes in which price depends in part on actual cost generally substantially outperform pure price caps, particularly in terms of consumers' surplus.

Overview

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Crossref · 10.2307/2555580

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  • Menus of contracts, profit-sharing or sliding-scale arrangements, and ratchets are likely to provide a better balance between performance incentives and rent extraction goals.

    “Indeed, menus of contracts, profit-sharing or sliding-scale arrangements (Lyon, 1996), and ratchets are likely to provide a better balance between performance incentives and rent extraction goals (e.g., Laffont & Tirole, 1993; Schmalensee, 1989).”

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Metadata

Authors
Schmalensee, R.
Corresponding author
Schmalensee, Richard
Venue
The RAND Journal of Economics
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1989
Volume
20
Issue
3
Pages
417
ISSN
0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2072067086
Cited by
191
References
15
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 4 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 37 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 7 · 2012: 2
FWCI
2.75
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The RAND Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
  • Social Sciences › Public Administration › Regulation and Compliance Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Legal and Constitutional Studies
Keywords
regulatory regimes, price cap regulation, uncertainty, consumer surplus, regulatory objectives, natural monopoly regulation

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