The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral Options and Contract Length
Abstract
In this article we consider the ways in which the desire for efficient, low-cost adaptation to change influences the tradeoff between the design and duration of long-term contractual relationships. We examine the distortions in contract terms occasioned by nonprice competition for natural gas in the presence of wellhead price regulation. Deviations from optimal contract incentives significantly raise the cost of being bound to long-term agreements and shorten the duration of contracts. The approach we adopt suggests a method for empirically assessing the efficiency of alternative contracting practices and legal standards.
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Cites
Limited-dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics
Maddala, G. S. (1983) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511810176 · Cited by 13,240
Williamson, O. E. (1975) · Cited by 6,810
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process
Klein, B., Crawford, R. G., & Alchian, A. A. (1978) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466922 · Cited by 5,791
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653
Hart, O., & Holmström, B. (1987) · Advances in Economic Theory · doi:10.1017/ccol0521340446.003 · Cited by 1,330
Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with Respect to CATV
Williamson, O. E. (1976) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003191 · Cited by 862
Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts: The Case of Coal-burning Electric Generating Plants
(1985) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036889 · Cited by 704
The Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry
Masten, S. E. (1984) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467071 · Cited by 682
Self-citationLong-term contracting, sticky prices, and monetary policy
Barro, R. J. (1977) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3932(77)90024-1 · Cited by 519
On Indexation and Contract Length
Gray, J. A. (1978) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260644 · Cited by 342
Cited by
Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results
Lafontaine, F. (1992) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555988 · Cited by 1,118
Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment
(1995) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036875 · Cited by 987
Make, Buy, or Ally: A Transaction Cost Theory Meta-Analysis
Geyskens, I., Steenkamp, J.-B. E. M., & Kumar, N. (2006) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2006.21794670 · Cited by 928
Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts
Segal, I. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00078 · Cited by 377
The Logic of Economic Organization
(1988) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036949 · Cited by 366
Metadata
- Authors
- Crocker, K. J., & Masten, S. E.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1988
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 327
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2084424907
- Cited by
- 329
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 12.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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