The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Monopoly with Incomplete Information
Abstract
Recent theoretical research on principal-agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other's actions. Here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal (the monopolist). The main contribution is to show that, under a separability assumption, strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes. Although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market, the results also shed light on related topics, such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling.
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citationA Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse Monopoly
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Goldfarb, A., & Tucker, C. (2019) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20171452 · Cited by 2,744
Log-concave probability and its applications
Bagnoli, M., & Bergstrom, T. (2006) · Studies in Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/3-540-29578-x_11 · Cited by 963
The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information
Hirshleifer, J., & Riley, J. G. (1992) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139167635 · Cited by 842
Self-citationConditioning prices on purchase history
Acquisti, A., & Varian, H. R. (2005) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.1040.0103 · Cited by 689
The Handbook of Organizational Economics
(2013) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400845354 · Cited by 659
Metadata
- Authors
- Maskin, E., & Riley, J.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1984
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 171
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1973214627
- Cited by
- 1,140
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 31.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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