The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-Agent Analysis
Abstract
This article models the process of bidding for government contracts in the presence of moral hazard. Several (possibly risk-averse) potential contractors (agents) submit sealed bids, on the basis of which the government (principal) selects one to perform a task. The optimal linear contract is derived. The bidding process induces the potential agents to reveal their relative expected costs. The optimal contract trades off giving the chosen agent an incentive to limit costs against stimulating bidding competition and sharing risks. The optimal contract is never cost-plus, may be fixed-price, but is usually an incentive contract. Some prescriptions for government contracting emerge.
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Citations
Cites
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911865 · Cited by 3,753
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1992) · Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7957-5_16 · Cited by 1,913
The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
Rogerson, W. P. (1985) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913212 · Cited by 868
Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
Maskin, E. S., & Riley, J. G. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913516 · Cited by 746
Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
Matthews, S. A. (1983) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90113-8 · Cited by 205
The Theory of Contractual Incentives for Cost Reduction
Scherer, F. M. (1964) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879326 · Cited by 77
A Theory of Linear Profit-Sharing Incentives
Berhold, M. (1971) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885933 · Cited by 75
Incentive Contracting for National Defense: A Problem of Optimal Risk Sharing
Cummins, J. M. (1977) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003492 · Cited by 47
Cited by
Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature
Klemperer, P. (1999) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/1467-6419.00083 · Cited by 1,394
Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts
Bajari, P., & Tadelis, S. (2001) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2696361 · Cited by 1,098
Performance Contracting in After-Sales Service Supply Chains
Kim, S.-H., Cohen, M. A., & Netessine, S. (2007) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1070.0741 · Cited by 520
An equilibrium model of incentive contracts in the presence of information manipulation
Goldman, E., & Slezak, S. L. (2006) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.05.007 · Cited by 466
Reinventing the Bazaar: A Natural History of Markets.
Cheung, S. L. (2003) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.13915 · Cited by 336
Metadata
- Authors
- McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1986
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 326
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2034730278
- Cited by
- 421
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 9.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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