The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An equilibrium model of incentive contracts in the presence of information manipulation
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Citations
Cites
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Becker, G. S. (1968) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259394 · Cited by 13,999
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261677 · Cited by 5,083
The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.
Ross, S. A. (1973) · American Economic Review · Cited by 4,269
The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions
Healy, P. M. (1985) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(85)90029-1 · Cited by 3,283
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
The effects of bonus schemes on accounting decisions
Healy, P. M. (2011) · DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) · Cited by 2,579
Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior
Stein, J. C. (1989) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937861 · Cited by 2,563
CEO incentives and earnings management
Bergstresser, D. B. (2004) · Cited by 2,392
Research works printed but not linked: 4
- Baron, 1987, Monitoring, moral hazard, asymmetric information, and risk sharing in procurement contracting, The Rand Journal of Economics, 18, 509, 10.2307/2555639 · doi:10.2307/2555639
- Ke, B., 2003. The influence of equity-based compensation on CEO's incentives to report strings of consecutive earnings increases. Unpublished working paper. Penn State University. · doi:10.2139/ssrn.446540
- Khalil, 1995, Collusive auditors, American Economic Review, 85, 442
- McAfee, 1987, Competition for agency contracts, The Rand Journal of Economics, 18, 296, 10.2307/2555554 · doi:10.2307/2555554
Cited by
Frydman, C., & Jenter, D. (2010) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-120209-133958 · Cited by 542
The Economics of Fraudulent Accounting
Kedia, S., & Philippon, T. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhm016 · Cited by 448
Board Committees, CEO Compensation, and Earnings Management
Laux, C., & Laux, V. (2009) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2009.84.3.869 · Cited by 322
Transparency and corporate governance
Hermalin, B. E. (2014) · Enterprise Law · doi:10.4337/9781781004456.00032 · Cited by 6
Metadata
- Authors
- Goldman, E., & Slezak, S. L.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2006-06
- Volume
- 80
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 603-626
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121301314
- Cited by
- 466
- References
- 49
- FWCI
- 73.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
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- Goldman, E., & Slezak, S. L. (2006). An equilibrium model of incentive contracts in the presence of information manipulation. Journal of Financial Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.05.007
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
