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Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery
Open accessAbstract
The "induced-demand" model states that in the face of negative income shocks, physicians may exploit their agency relationship with patients by providing excessive care. We test this model using an exogenous change in the financial environment facing obstetrician/gynecologists: declining fertility in the United States. We argue that the 13.5% fall in fertility over the 1970-1982 period led ob/gyns to substitute from normal childbirth toward a more highly reimbursed alternative, cesarean delivery. Using a nationally representative microdata set for this period, we show that there is a strong correlation between within-state declines in fertility and within-state increases in cesarean utilization.
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Citations
Cited by
Levitt, S. D., & Syverson, C. (2008) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest.90.4.599 · Cited by 604
Do Physicians' Financial Incentives Affect Medical Treatment and Patient Health?
Clemens, J., & Gottlieb, J. D. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.4.1320 · Cited by 485
(2000) · Handbook of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/s1574-0064(00)80168-7 · Cited by 430
Physician fees and procedure intensity: the case of cesarean delivery
Gruber, J., Kim, J., & Mayzlin, D. (1999) · Journal of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/s0167-6296(99)00009-0 · Cited by 284
Self-citationFirst Do No Harm? Tort Reform and Birth Outcomes*
Currie, J., & MacLeod, W. B. (2008) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2008.123.2.795 · Cited by 256
Metadata
- Authors
- Gruber, J., & Owings, M.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1996
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 99
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3025190267
- Cited by
- 400
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 7.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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