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Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly: All-Out Competition and Strategic Commitment
Open accessAbstract
Price discrimination by imperfectly competitive firms may intensify competition, leading to lower prices for all consumers; the tradeoff of consumer groups' welfare that is characteristic of monopolistic discrimination need not arise. This escalation of competition may make firms worse off, and as a result firms may wish to avoid the discriminatory outcome. Under conditions similar to those in which unambiguous price and welfare effects may arise, unilateral commitments not to price discriminate - including the adoption of everyday low pricing or no-haggle policies - may raise firm profits by softening price competition.
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Citations
Cited by
Goldfarb, A., & Tucker, C. (2019) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20171452 · Cited by 2,744
Geo-Conquesting: Competitive Locational Targeting of Mobile Promotions
Fong, N. M., Fang, Z., & Luo, X. (2015) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1509/jmr.14.0229 · Cited by 323
Price Discrimination and Bargaining: Empirical Evidence from Medical Devices
Grennan, M. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.1.145 · Cited by 323
Big data and personalized price discrimination in EU competition law
Townley, C., Morrison, E., & Yeung, K. (2017) · Yearbook of European Law · doi:10.1093/yel/yex015 · Cited by 61
CUSTOMER POACHING AND ADVERTISING*
ESTEVES, R. B. (2009) · The Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6451.2009.00372.x · Cited by 55
Metadata
- Authors
- Corts, K. S.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1998
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 306
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2000673246
- Cited by
- 387
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 12.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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