The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Contractual Form, Retail Price, and Asset Characteristics in Gasoline Retailing
Abstract
Predictions from a principal-agent analysis of the manufacturer-retailer relationship are tested using microdata on contractual form, retail outlet characteristics, and retail prices for gasoline stations in eastern Massachusetts. The empirical results are consistent with upstream firms choosing contracts with strong incentives but less direct control when outlet characteristics make unobservable effort by downstream agents important. Manufacturers trade off incentive power for more direct control when observable effort is relatively more important. There is some evidence that the retail prices of some gasoline products are lower when the upstream firm is allowed to control the retail price directly.
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Citations
Cites
The Theory of Industrial Organization
Jean Tirole, Z. (1988) · MIT Press Books · Cited by 8,651
Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results
Lafontaine, F. (1992) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555988 · Cited by 1,118
The choice of organizational form The case of franchising
Brickley, J. A., & Dark, F. H. (1987) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(87)90046-8 · Cited by 1,076
The theory of the firm and the structure of the franchise contract
Rubin, P. H. (1978) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466918 · Cited by 1,005
Contract duration and relationship-specific investments: Empirical evidence from coal markets
Joskow, P. L. (1987) · American Economic Review · Cited by 954
An Empirical Look at Franchising as an Organizational Form
Norton, S. W. (1988) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296428 · Cited by 548
Dual Distribution and Royalty Fees in Franchising
Gallini, N. T., & Lutz, N. A. (1992) · The Journal of Law Economics and Organization · Cited by 271
Vertical contractual relationsPreprint
Katz, M. L. (1989) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 231
The Effects of Different Contractual Arrangements: The Case of Retail Gasoline Markets
Barron, J. M., & Umbeck, J. (1984) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467067 · Cited by 117
Cited by
The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited
Holmström, B., & Roberts, J. (1998) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.12.4.73 · Cited by 1,176
Do Gasoline Prices Respond Asymmetrically to Crude Oil Price Changes?
Borenstein, S., Cameron, A. C., & Gilbert, R. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555118 · Cited by 1,025
Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence
Lafontaine, F., & Slade, M. (2007) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.45.3.629 · Cited by 711
The Handbook of Organizational Economics
(2013) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400845354 · Cited by 659
The choice among acquisitions, alliances, and divestitures
Villalonga, B., & McGahan, A. M. (2005) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.493 · Cited by 498
Metadata
- Authors
- Shepard, A.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1993
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 58
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2012105137
- Cited by
- 284
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 22.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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