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Adverse Selection as a Barrier to Entry in the Banking Industry

Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni, Friedman, Ezra, Marquez, Robert·1999·The RAND Journal of Economics

Abstract

Banks offering credit to borrowers are faced with uncertainty about their creditworthiness. If banks obtain information about borrowers after lending to them, they are able to reject riskier borrowers when refinancing. Potential entrant banks will face an adverse-selection problem stemming from their inability to distinguish new borrowers from old borrowers who have been rejected by their previous bank. We analyze the effects of asymmetric information on the market structure of the banking industry. We characterize the equilibrium under Bertrand competition with two banks, and show than an equilibrium where a third bank enters does not exist (blockaded entry).

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Metadata

Authors
Dell'Ariccia, G., Friedman, E., & Marquez, R.
Venue
The RAND Journal of Economics
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1999
Volume
30
Issue
3
Pages
515
ISSN
0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2074184863
Cited by
342
References
0
FWCI
23.24
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Adverse Selection as a Barrier to Entry in the Banking Industry. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2556061
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Dell'Ariccia, G., Friedman, E., & Marquez, R. (1999). Adverse Selection as a Barrier to Entry in the Banking Industry. The RAND Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/2556061

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