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Cited by 417Banking stability, regulation, efficiencyMerger and Competition AnalysisEconomic theories and models

Competition, Adverse Selection, and Information Dispersion in the Banking Industry: Table 1

Marquez, Robert·2002·Review of Financial Studies
DOI 10.1093/rfs/15.3.901
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Abstract

Proprietary information generated through the process of lending can impact the structure of the banking industry. With more competing banks, borrower-specific information becomes more disperse, as each bank becomes informed about a smaller pool of borrowers. This reduces banks’ screening ability, creating an inefficiency as more low-quality borrowers obtain financing. Incumbent banks’ information advantage may also create difficulties for potential entrants, so that entry should be easier in markets with high borrower turnover or where entrants have specific expertise in evaluating credit risks. We draw implications for whether financial deregulation is likely to increase borrowers’ surplus, and what patterns of entry might be observed.

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Crossref · 10.1093/rfs/15.3.901

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42 of 42 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Competition lowers the probability of a bank granting a loan, which unfavourably affects financial inclusion.

    “Thus, competition lowers the probability of a bank to grant a loan (Marquez 2002), which unfavourably affects financial inclusion.”

    From Financial inclusion, bank competition and economic growth in Africa (2021) · cites this paper as Marquez 2002

  • The information hypothesis suggests an inverse relationship between bank competition and financial inclusion.

    “The information hypothesis suggests an inverse relationship between bank competition and financial inclusion.”

    From Financial inclusion, bank competition and economic growth in Africa (2021) · cites this paper as Marquez 2002

  • Competition lowers the probability of a bank to grant a loan, which unfavourably affects financial inclusion.

    “Thus, competition lowers the probability of a bank to grant a loan (Marquez 2002), which unfavourably affects financial inclusion.”

    From Financial inclusion, bank competition and economic growth in Africa (2021) · cites this paper as Marquez 2002

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Authors
Marquez, R.
Affiliations
University of Maryland, College Park (US)
Corresponding author
Marquez, Robert
ORCID
Marquez, Robert
Venue
Review of Financial Studies
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2002-04
Volume
15
Issue
3
Pages
901-926
ISSN
  • 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
  • 1465-7368
DOI
10.1093/rfs/15.3.901
OpenAlex
W3123431656
Cited by
417
References
42
Citations by year
2026: 16 · 2025: 27 · 2024: 24 · 2023: 26 · 2022: 24 · 2021: 27 · 2020: 22 · 2019: 16 · 2018: 26 · 2017: 17 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 17 · 2014: 15 · 2013: 15 · 2012: 12
FWCI
19.69
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Review of Financial Studies (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic theories and models
Keywords
bank competition, adverse selection, information dispersion, incumbent banks, market entry, credit risk assessment, financial deregulation

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