The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Strategic Bidding in a Multiunit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity in England and Wales
Open accessAbstract
I consider bidding behavior in the daily electricity auction in England and Wales. Theoretical work on uniform-price multiunit procurement auctions suggests that bidders offering more than one unit have an incentive to increase their bids at high quantities. If a bid sets a high equilibrium price, it applies to all inframarginal units. I find evidence of strategic bid increases in the electricity auctions. First, plants that are likely to be used after other plants are already operating bid more. Second, the larger supplier submits higher bids for similar plants. Last, bids for a given plant are slightly higher on days when more of the capacity that is typically inframarginal to that plant is available.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Pass-Through of Emissions Costs in Electricity Markets
Fabra, N., & Reguant, M. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.9.2872 · Cited by 491
Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment
List, J. A., & Lucking-Reiley, D. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.961 · Cited by 171
Metadata
- Authors
- Wolfram, C. D.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1998
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 703
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2004046442
- Cited by
- 399
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 24.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Strategic Bidding in a Multiunit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity in England and Wales. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2556090
- The paper
- Wolfram, C. D. (1998). Strategic Bidding in a Multiunit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity in England and Wales. The RAND Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/2556090
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
