The DOI matches its Crossref record; 54 of the 54 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corporate Restructuring: Governance and Control Limits of the Internal Capital Market
Abstract
Corporate restructuring that is sparked by the threat of a takeover provides evidence that corporate governance limits of large diversified (M-form) firms may exist. This paper proposes that poor corporate monitoring, which is due to atomistic ownership patterns and inadequate board of director governance, an emphasis on incentive compensation, and free cash flows, may lead to higher levels of diversification. If diversification results in loss of strategic control and poor performance, the threat of a takeover is likely to be related to the incidence of corporate restructuring. Corporate restructuring, in turn, is likely to (a) result in the correction of inadequate governance patterns, (b) create a more focused diversification strategy, (c) increase strategic control, (d) reduce reliance on bureaucratic control through reduced corporate staff, and (e) increase the performance of the firm and shareholder wealth.
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Cites
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Cited by
STRATEGY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES.
Hoskisson, R. E., Eden, L., Lau, C. M., & Wright, M. (2000) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/1556394 · Cited by 3,835
Self-citationTheoretical Perspectives for Strategic Human Resource Management
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A Behavioral Agency Model of Managerial Risk Taking
Wiseman, R. M., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1998) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/259103 · Cited by 1,591
INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION THROUGH START-UP OR ACQUISITION: A LEARNING PERSPECTIVE.
Barkema, H. G., & Vermeulen, F. (1998) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256894 · Cited by 1,579
Metadata
- Authors
- Hoskisson, R. E., & Turk, T. A.
- Venue
- The Academy of Management Review
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 1990-07
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 459
- ISSN
- 0363-7425 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2143328014
- Cited by
- 335
- References
- 54
- FWCI
- 35.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.