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Cited by 260

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences

Feddersen, Timothy J., Pesendorfer, Wolfgang·1999·American Political Science Review
DOI 10.2307/2585402
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Abstract

We analyze a model of a two-candidate election with costless voting in which voters have asymmetric information and diverse preferences. We demonstrate that a strictly positive fraction of the electorate will abstain and that, nevertheless, elections effectively aggregate voters' private information. Using examples, we show that more informed voters are more likely to vote than their less informed counterparts. Increasing the fraction of the electorate that is informed, however, may lead to higher levels of abstention. We conclude by showing that a biased distribution of information can lead to a biased voting population but does not lead to biased outcomes.

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Metadata

Authors
Feddersen, T. J., & Pesendorfer, W.
Venue
American Political Science Review
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
1999-06
Volume
93
Issue
2
Pages
381-398
ISSN
  • 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5943
DOI
10.2307/2585402
OpenAlex
W1980816265
Cited by
260
References
18
FWCI
6.10
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2585402
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Feddersen, T. J., & Pesendorfer, W. (1999). Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences. American Political Science Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/2585402

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.