The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences
Abstract
We analyze a model of a two-candidate election with costless voting in which voters have asymmetric information and diverse preferences. We demonstrate that a strictly positive fraction of the electorate will abstain and that, nevertheless, elections effectively aggregate voters' private information. Using examples, we show that more informed voters are more likely to vote than their less informed counterparts. Increasing the fraction of the electorate that is informed, however, may lead to higher levels of abstention. We conclude by showing that a biased distribution of information can lead to a biased voting population but does not lead to biased outcomes.
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Cites
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Feddersen, T. J., & Pesendorfer, W. (1995) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 651
Self-citationVoting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
Feddersen, T. J., & Pesendorfer, W. (1997) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171878 · Cited by 607
Self-citationA Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action
Lohmann, S. (1993) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2939043 · Cited by 460
A strategic calculus of voting
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Groups in Rational Turnout Models
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Hill, K. Q., Leighley, J. E., & Hinton-Andersson, A. (1995) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111758 · Cited by 216
Information, Participation, and Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy in Perspective
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Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
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Self-citationAn Experimental Study of Jury Decisions
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Cited by
From Violence to Voting: War and Political Participation in Uganda
BLATTMAN, C. (2009) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055409090212 · Cited by 898
Political institutions and policy choices: evidence from the United States
Besley, T. (2002) · Working Paper Series · doi:10.1920/wp.ifs.2002.0213 · Cited by 577
Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting
Feddersen, T. J. (2004) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533004773563458 · Cited by 440
Self-citationChong, A., De La O, A. L., Karlan, D., & Wantchekon, L. (2015) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/678766 · Cited by 406
Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States
Besley, T., & Case, A. (2003) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.41.1.7 · Cited by 401
Metadata
- Authors
- Feddersen, T. J., & Pesendorfer, W.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1999-06
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 381-398
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W1980816265
- Cited by
- 260
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 6.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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