The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Communication in Settings with No Transfers
Abstract
Consider a setting commonly found in intrafirm, regulatory, and political relationships wherein an uninformed decision maker, attempting to elicit information from an informed party affected by his decision, is unable to use transfers. This article examines whether both parties will agree on the introduction of communication-based organizational structures; results in prior research suggest they will. In contrast we demonstrate that when there is enough disagreement between the two parties, introducing communication benefits the decision maker but leads to a loss for the informed party. This result holds both when the decision maker can commit to a decision rule (as in Holmstom (1977)) and when he cannot (as in Crawford and Sobel (1982)). We also show that in the commitment case, with enough disagreement, the optimal communication-based decision rule is discontinuous. Our results suggest a possible rationale for observed legal and regulatory limitations on the information decision makers can elicit from other parties, as well as for attempts by various parties to avoid preplay communication.
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Citations
Cites
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Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games
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Cheap Talk and the Fed: A Theory of Imprecise Policy Announcments
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Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
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Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
Matthews, S. A. (1989) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937851 · Cited by 217
On The Theory of DelegationPreprint
Holmstrom, B. R. (1980) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 181
Communication between rational agents
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Asymmetry of Pre-Decision Information and Managerial Accounting
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Centralization Versus Delegation and the Value of Communication
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Self-citationHonesty in a Model of Strategic Information Transmission
Schotter, A., & Pitchik, C. (1987) · American Economic Review · Cited by 132
Value of communication in agencies
Melumad, N. D., & Reichelstein, S. J. (1989) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(89)90023-9 · Cited by 124
Self-citationCommunication and Post-Decision Information
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Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests
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Cited by
Kamenica, E., & Gentzkow, M. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.6.2590 · Cited by 1,903
Authority and Communication in Organizations
Dessein, W. (2002) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00227 · Cited by 964
When Does Coordination Require Centralization?
Alonso, R., Dessein, W., & Matouschek, N. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.1.145 · Cited by 623
Executive Compensation Tied to ESG Performance: International Evidence
COHEN, S., KADACH, I., ORMAZABAL, G., & REICHELSTEIN, S. (2023) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12481 · Cited by 393
ALONSO, R., & MATOUSCHEK, N. (2008) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00471.x · Cited by 350
Metadata
- Authors
- Melumad, N. D., & Shibano, T.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1991
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 173
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2056181035
- Cited by
- 279
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 1.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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