The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Democracy and National Economic Performance: The Preference for Stability
Abstract
appear to arise because democracies ameliorate the effects of social cleavages, another mechanism that might explain democratic stability. When growth and volatility are jointly examined, democracies reveal highly favorable economic results. oes democracy affect national economic performance and, if so, how? No question is more central to the study of political economics. Almost all previous work on democracy and economic performance has focused exclusively on growth rates, with contradictory and confusing results. In this article, we argue that, to reveal the impact of democratic institutions on economic performance, scholars must consider two dimensions of economic performance-growth rate and volatility. We begin with a novel hypothesis: economic policy in democracy is risk avoiding relative to policy in nondemocracies. 1 Because voters are riskaverse, they penalize incumbent governments for economic volatility, and democratic governments respond accordingly. In nondemocracies, we posit that elites are more likely to seek risk that voters would reject. Consequently, autocracies produce systematically more economic volatility than
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Cites
Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy
Barro, R. J., & Gordon, D. B. (1983) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3932(83)90051-x · Cited by 3,610
Modernization: Theories and Facts
Przeworski, A., & Limongi, F. (1997) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.1997.0004 · Cited by 1,983
Where did all the growth go? external shocks, social conflict, and growth collapses
Rodrik, D. (1999) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1023/a:1009863208706 · Cited by 1,869
Cited by
Democracy and Economic Growth: A Meta‐Analysis
Doucouliagos, H., & Ulubaşoğlu, M. A. (2008) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00299.x · Cited by 584
Papaioannou, E., & Siourounis, G. (2008) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02189.x · Cited by 470
Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II
Jones, B. F., & Olken, B. A. (2004) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.524042 · Cited by 427
The Anatomy of Start-Stop Growth
Jones, B. F., & Olken, B. A. (2008) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest.90.3.582 · Cited by 301
KUNG, J. K.-S., & CHEN, S. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055410000626 · Cited by 298
Metadata
- Authors
- Quinn, D. P., & Woolley, J. T.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2001-07
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 634
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2012116515
- Cited by
- 243
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 36.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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