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Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong
Abstract
1. Philosophical Introduction: The Background Theory. 2. Unphilosophical Introduction: What Concepts Have To Be. 3. The Demise of Definitions, Part I: The Linguist's Tale. 4. The Demise of Definitions, Part II: The Philosopher's Tale. 5. Prototypes and Compositionality. (Appendix 5A: Meaning Postulates. Appendix 5B: The 'Theory Theory' of Concepts.) 6. Innateness and Ontology, Part I: The Standard Argument. (Appendix 6A: Similarity.) 7. Innateness and Ontology, Part II: Intentional Laws and Natural Kinds. (Appendix 7A: Round Squares.) Bibliography Index
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Cited by
Prolegomenon to a Theory of Argument Structure
Hale, K., & Keyser, S. J. (2002) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5634.001.0001 · Cited by 1,492
The Ecology and Semiotics of Language Learning: A Sociocultural Perspective
(2004) · Educational Linguistics · doi:10.1007/1-4020-7912-5 · Cited by 1,349
Grounding conceptual knowledge in modality-specific systems
Barsalou, L. W., Kyle Simmons, W., Barbey, A. K., & Wilson, C. D. (2003) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(02)00029-3 · Cited by 1,256
Is vision continuous with cognition?: The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception
Pylyshyn, Z. (1999) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x99002022 · Cited by 1,243
Modularity in cognition: Framing the debate.
Barrett, H. C., & Kurzban, R. (2006) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.113.3.628 · Cited by 785
Metadata
- Authors
- Bach, K., & Fodor, J. A.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2000-10
- Volume
- 109
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 627
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2077350696
- Cited by
- 928
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 87.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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