The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts
Abstract
В статье представлена модель, объясняющая многие стилизованные факты о контрактах на поставку (procurement contracts). Согласно модели покупатель несет издержки дизайна контракта и сталкивается с дилеммой: либо создавать стимулы у продавцов не проявлять оппортунизм, либо снижать ex post трансакционные издержки, связанные с затратами на пересмотр контракта. Авторы показывают, в каких случаях контракты с фиксированной ценой и контракты, составленные по принципу издержки плюс, будут превалировать над остальными стимулирующими контрактами. Также делается вывод о том, что в случае высокой сложности товара внутрифирменное производство будет доминировать рыночные контракты на поставку.
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Cites
Coase, R. H. (1937) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x · Cited by 23,972
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Bandiera, O., Prat, A., & Valletti, T. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.1278 · Cited by 534
Bapna, R., Barua, A., Mani, D., & Mehra, A. (2010) · Information Systems Research · doi:10.1287/isre.1100.0328 · Cited by 147
Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes
Decarolis, F., Giuffrida, L., Iossa, E., Mollisi, V., & Spagnolo, G. (2018) · doi:10.3386/w24201 · Cited by 88
Formal and Informal Contracting: Theory and Evidence
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bajari, P., & Tadelis, S.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2001
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 387
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123362894
- Cited by
- 1,098
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 58.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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