The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Threat of Unionization, the Use of Debt, and the Preservation of Shareholder Wealth
Abstract
This paper argues that firms use debt to protect the wealth of shareholders from the threat of unionization. Under U. S. labor law the firm cannot prohibit its workers from attempting to form a collective bargaining unit. Debt policy offers a method of reducing the impact of this monopoly right on shareholders. By issuing debt, the firm credibly reduces the funds that are available to a potential union. Empirical evidence that strongly supports this hypothesis is presented.
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Cites
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1986) · Cited by 17,275
The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment
Miller, M. H. (1958) · American Economic Review · Cited by 14,574
Nash, J. (1953) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1906951 · Cited by 3,177
Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargaining Approach
Grout, P. A. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911498 · Cited by 945
Testing between Competing Models of Wage and Employment Determination in Unionized Markets
MaCurdy, T. E., & Pencavel, J. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261398 · Cited by 321
Union Rent Seeking, Intangible Capital, and Market Value of the Firm
Connolly, R. A., Hirsch, B. T., & Hirschey, M. (1986) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/1924515 · Cited by 318
Tobin's q, Unionization, and the Concentration-Profits Relationship
Salinger, M. A. (1984) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555673 · Cited by 274
The Effect of Wage Bargains on the Stock Market Value of the Firm
Abowd, J. M. (1989) · American Economic Review · Cited by 227
Unionization and Profitability: Evidence from the Capital Market
Ruback, R. S., & Zimmerman, M. B. (1984) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261278 · Cited by 213
Productivity and Labor Unions: An Application of the Theory of Self- Enforcing Contracts
Baldwin, C. Y. (1983) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296195 · Cited by 199
Cited by
Financial Distress and Corporate Performance
OPLER, T. C., & TITMAN, S. (1994) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb00086.x · Cited by 1,664
Buyer–Supplier Relationships and the Stakeholder Theory of Capital Structure
BANERJEE, S., DASGUPTA, S., & KIM, Y. (2008) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01403.x · Cited by 631
Firing Costs and Capital Structure Decisions
SERFLING, M. (2016) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12403 · Cited by 617
Capital Structure as a Strategic Variable: Evidence from Collective Bargaining
MATSA, D. A. (2010) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01565.x · Cited by 607
Employee treatment and firm leverage: A test of the stakeholder theory of capital structure
Bae, K.-H., Kang, J.-K., & Wang, J. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.10.019 · Cited by 571
Metadata
- Authors
- Bronars, S. G., & Deere, D. R.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1991-02-01
- Volume
- 106
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 231-254
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2037384821
- Cited by
- 421
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 20.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Bronars, S. G., & Deere, D. R. (1991). The Threat of Unionization, the Use of Debt, and the Preservation of Shareholder Wealth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/2937914
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.