The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
Abstract
Deductive equilibrium analysis often fails to provide a unique equilibrium solution in many situations of strategic interdependence. Consequently, a theory of equilibrium selection would be a useful complement to the theory of equilibrium points. A salient equilibrium selection principle would allow decision makers to implement a mutual best response outcome. This paper uses the experimental method to examine the salience of payoff-dominance, security, and historical precedents in related average opinion games. The systematic and, hence, predictable behavior observed in the experiments suggests that it should be possible to construct an accurate theory of equilibrium selection.
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Cites
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A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in GamesPreprint
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Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
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Cited by
Roth, A. E., & Erev, I. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80020-x · Cited by 1,678
Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
Camerer, C., & Hua Ho, T. (1999) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00054 · Cited by 1,487
Ending Footbinding and Infibulation: A Convention Account
Mackie, G. (1996) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2096305 · Cited by 777
Adaptation in vertical relationships: beyond incentive conflict
Gulati, R., Lawrence, P. R., & Puranam, P. (2005) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.458 · Cited by 616
Landscape Design: Designing for Local Action in Complex Worlds
Levinthal, D. A., & Warglien, M. (1999) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.10.3.342 · Cited by 483
Metadata
- Authors
- Van Huyck, J. B., Battalio, R. C., & Beil, R. O.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1991-08-01
- Volume
- 106
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 885-910
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2014426346
- Cited by
- 436
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 14.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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