“Of Sensory Systems and the ‘Aboutness’ of Mental States”
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Items 101–200 of 276
Practisingpragmatist–Wittgensteinianism
Hutchinson, P., & Read, R. (2013) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139022132.011 · Cited by 12
Imagination over truth: Rorty's contribution to pragmatism
Malachowski, A. R. (2013) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139022132.013 · Cited by 7
Visual and bodily sensational perception: an epistemic asymmetry
Munro, D. (2019) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02304-8 · Cited by 5
Spurrett, D. (2015) · South African Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/02580136.2015.1057358 · Cited by 5
Teleonomic functions and intrinsic intentionality: Dretske’s theory as a test case
Shani, I. (2006) · Cognitive Systems Research · doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2006.06.001 · Cited by 4
“In particular, it raises the question how can the rich texture of our ordinary representations of the world around us be constructed out of such seemingly primitive, and thoroughly action-oriented, information (while Akins, 1996; is a skeptic, detailed attempts to provide a positive solution to the problem are suggest…”
BackgroundSchellenberg on Perceptual Capacities
Cohen, J. (2019) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/anz008 · Cited by 4
“In a now-classic paper, Akins (1996) argues forcefully that this form of perception is much better understood as delivering information about something “narcissistic,” or subject-involving (e.g., a steepness of temporal or spatial gradient between two responses in one perceptual system), rather…”
BackgroundCunning, D. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139088220.004 · Cited by 4
5. Evolving artificial minds and brains
Mandik, P., Collins, M., & Vereschagin, A. (2007) · Studies in language companion series · doi:10.1075/slcs.92.07man · Cited by 4
Adaptive diversity and misbelief
Cokely, E. T., & Feltz, A. (2009) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x09991415 · Cited by 4
Measuring the World: Olfaction as a Process Model of PerceptionPreprint
Barwich, A. (2018) · PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) · Cited by 4
Cunning, D. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139088220.001 · Cited by 4
Practical perceptual representations: a contemporary defense of an old idea
Springle, A. A., & Buccella, A. (2024) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04463-1 · Cited by 21
“In other words, they are still committed to the view that perception, to use Kathleen Akins’s phrase, is engaged in an “ontological project” of categorizing environmental particulars and their properties (Akins, 1996, p. 396).”
The Represented Object of Color Experience
Schier, E. (2006) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515080600901988 · Cited by 3
“However it should be noted that Akins and Hahn (Akins, 1996; Akins & Hahn, 2000) have argued that the ontological and representational questions are distinct and that the absence of a mapping from phenomenal experiences to an objective property is not evidence for internalism:”
BackgroundInfluentialLycan, W. G. (2024) · doi:10.1093/9780191968044.001.0001 · Cited by 4
Introduction: the pragmatist orientation
Malachowski, A. R. (2013) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139022132.002 · Cited by 3
Miller, M. C. (2013) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139022132.015 · Cited by 6
The Individual Variability Problem
Gatzia, D. E. (2010) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-009-9234-0 · Cited by 4
The Fourth Meditation: Descartes’ theodicyavant la lettre
Lennon, T. M. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139088220.009 · Cited by 3
Kirk, R. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199285489.003.0005 · Cited by 3
Ontology and realism about modality
Elder, C. L. (1999) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048409912349051 · Cited by 4
Better limited systematicity in hand than structural descriptions in the bush: A reply to Hummel
Edelman, S., & Intrator, N. (2003) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1016/s0364-0213(03)00005-3 · Cited by 3
Representation in Biological Systems: Teleofunction, Etiology, and Structural Preservation
Nair‐Collins, M. (2012) · Biosemiotics/Biosemiotics. Bookseries · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-5419-5_8 · Cited by 2
Three misconceptions concerning strong embodiment
Dempsey, L. P., & Shani, I. (2014) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-014-9360-4 · Cited by 3
Thermal Perception and its Relation to Touch
Gray, R. (2022) · Philosophers Imprint · doi:10.3998/phimp.2547 · Cited by 2
Heat, Temperature, and Phenomenal Concepts
Peschard, I., & Bitbol, M. (2008) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/7564.003.0012 · Cited by 5
Massively representational minds are not always driven by goals, conscious or otherwise
Huebner, B., & Rupert, R. D. (2014) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x13002045 · Cited by 2
Madary, M. (2013) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 3
Opponent Processing, Linear Models, and the Veridicality of Color Perception
Jakab, Z. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511610608.011 · Cited by 2
La réalité sans représentation, la théorie de l'énaction et sa légitimité épistémologique
Peschard, I. (2004) · HAL · Cited by 2
Locking on to the language of thought
Viger, C. (2001) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515080120051562 · Cited by 2
“[24] This point is cogently argued in Akins (1996).”
BackgroundWhat sensory signals are about
Elder, C. L. (1998) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/58.4.273 · Cited by 1
The Neurophilosophy of Consciousness
Mandik, P. (2017) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781119132363.ch33 · Cited by 2
“For example, she argues (1996) against traditional views of the role that sensory states play in grounding the contents of intentional states.”
BackgroundWhy Perceptual Experiences cannot be Probabilistic
Colombo, M., & Fresco, N. (2024) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqae014 · Cited by 1
“…at presenting us with an accurate representation of the external world, since perceptual experience involves widespread inaccuracy (e.g. Prettyman 2019 )— for instance, the human perceptual experience of temperature is exaggerated for temperatures that are likely to cause damage (cf. Akins 1996 ).”
BackgroundSeeing What to Do: Embodied Instructive Representations in Vision
Springle, A. A. (2024) · Synthese Library/Synthese library · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-57353-8_20 · Cited by 1
Evolution beyond determinism - on Dennett's compatibilism and the too timeless free will debate
Brincker, M. (2015) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 1
Farmer, D. J. (2007) · Administrative Theory & Praxis · doi:10.1080/10841806.2007.11029566 · Cited by 1
TheMeditationsand Descartes’ considered conception of God
Baier, A. C. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139088220.016 · Cited by 1
Matthen, M. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199268509.003.0008 · Cited by 1
Putnam, pragmatism and the fate of metaphysics
Macarthur, D. (2013) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139022132.012 · Cited by 1
The Third Meditation on Objective Being: Representation and Intentional Content
Schmitter, A. M. (2014) · ERA: Education and Research Archive (University of Alberta) · doi:10.7939/r3wh2dv5f · Cited by 1
Self-Interpretation as Software: Toward a New Understanding of Why False Self-Conceptions Persist
Zawidzki, T. W. (2018) · Contributions to phenomenology · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-98646-3_7 · Cited by 3
Koistinen, O. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139088220.012 · Cited by 1
Body-Swapping: Self-Attribution and Body Transfer Illusions (BTIs)
Jarvis, L. (2019) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-27971-4_4 · Cited by 3
The Rationality of Perception: Replies to Lord, Railton, and Pautz
Siegel, S. (2020) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12737 · Cited by 1
“Akins 1996, Prettyman 2019. 4 For relevant discussion, see Myers (ms) on imagination, Jenkin (2020) on core cognition and perceptual learning, Vance (2014) on emotion, Brownstein (2019) and Beeghly and Madva (2020) on implicit attitudes, Siegel (forthcoming) on patterns of association and attention, Watzl (forthcoming…”
BackgroundComputationally Constrained Beliefs
McDermott, D. (2013) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · Cited by 1
The Third Meditation on objective being:
Schmitter, A. M. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139088220.008 · Cited by 1
In defense of virtual veridicalism
Lee, Y. (2024) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-024-02256-x · Cited by 1
“I adapt the popular Inverted Earth (Block, 1990, 1996) for my argument.”
The Explanatory Value of the Cognitive Unconscious
Pageler, B. T. (2011) · CU Scholar (University of Colorado Boulder) · Cited by 2
Dewey's pragmatic aesthetics: the contours of experience
Hagberg, G. L. (2013) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139022132.017 · Cited by 5
Predictive Processing, Implicit and Explicit
Gładziejewski, P. (2022) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781003014584-12 · Cited by 1
Managing Redundancy at Multiple Levels of Motor Control
Bosga, J. (2008) · Radboud Repository (Radboud University) · Cited by 2
An Ecological Theory of Rational Interpretation
Hara, S. (2005) · Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.4288/jafpos1956.13.87 · Cited by 1
“…point out that an important characteristic of sensory organs is that they do not simply detect some ready-made properties; rather, they first organize in the physical world new properties to be detected and then proceed to detect them (Akins 1996, Dennett 1991: 375-383, Thompson et al. 1992).”
BackgroundKirk, R. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199285489.003.0003 · Cited by 1
Kirk, R. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199285489.003.0010 · Cited by 1
Olfaction As The Paradigm For Perceptual Philosophy
Keller, A. (2015) · CUNY Academic Works (City University of New York) · Cited by 2
Kirk, R. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199285489.003.0001 · Cited by 1
Brook, A., & Mandik, P. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511610608.001
Mental Representations: the New Sense-Data?Preprint
Stieg, C. (2004) · CogPrints (University of Southampton)
Misrepresentation and Non-conceptual Content
Fleming, M. (2000) · Dialogue · doi:10.1017/s0012217300007551
Evans’ Varieties of Reference and the anchoring problem
Anderson, M. L. (2003) · Robotics and Autonomous Systems · doi:10.1016/s0921-8890(03)00022-8
The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement
Kenari, M. A. (2014) · Art and Design Review · doi:10.4236/adr.2014.22004
“She argues that such systems are not representational at all (Akins, 2011).”
BackgroundL’intentionnalité, naturellement!
Faucher, L. (2007) · Philosophiques · doi:10.7202/015870ar
Jacob, P. (2007) · Philosophiques · doi:10.7202/015871ar
A NEUROCOMPUTATIONAL THEORY OF REPRESENTATIONAL CONTENT
Eliasmith, C. (2000)
Representationalism About Sensory Phenomenology
Ivanowich, M. (2015) · Scholarship@Western (Western University)
From Object to Affect in Literary Experience, Interpretation, and Evaluation
Norwood-Büdke, Z. (2013) · ResearchSpace (University of Auckland)
Ritchie, J. B., & Carruthers, P. (2015)
Matthen, M. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199268509.003.0005
List of Definitions and Named Theses
Matthen, M. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199268509.003.0016
The Sensory Classification Thesis
Matthen, M. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199268509.003.0002
Kirk, R. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199285489.003.0004
Sensory Classification: The View from Psychology
Matthen, M. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199268509.003.0003
Prelude: The New Philosophy of Vision
Matthen, M. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199268509.003.0001
Decision, Control, and Integration
Kirk, R. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199285489.003.0007
The Sources of Sensory Similarity
Matthen, M. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199268509.003.0006 · Cited by 1
De-sophisticating the Framework
Kirk, R. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199285489.003.0008
Matthen, M. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199268509.003.0010
Zombies and Minimal Physicalism
Kirk, R. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199285489.003.0002
The Semantic Theory of Colour Experience
Matthen, M. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199268509.003.0012
Perceptual Specialization and the Definition of Colour
Matthen, M. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199268509.003.0007
W. V. O. Quine: pragmatism within the limits of empiricism alone
Nevo, I. (2013) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139022132.008
Morris, K. J. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139088220.006
Keller, A. (2016) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-33645-9_4 · Cited by 1
Closing the Representational Gap: An Embodied-Enactive View of Narcissistic Representational Systems
Parchment, V. (2016) · Scholarship@Western (Western University)
Madary, M. (2019) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315184418-20
Toward a naturalistically explicable folk psychology
Hougaard, D. S. (2019) · SUNScholar (Stellenbosch University)
Seeking Salience: A Diagnostic Recognition Framework for Engaging Art
Seeley, W. P. (2020) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190662158.003.0003
Cognitivism at the Movies: A Diagnostic Recognition Framework
Seeley, W. P. (2020) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190662158.003.0008
World, Mind, and Perception (The Incorrect View)
Fiorin, G., & Delfitto, D. (2020) · Perspectives in pragmatics, psychology & philosophy · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-46317-5_32
In Defense of the No-Miracles Argument
Park, S. (2021) · Synthese Library/Synthese library · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-87813-9_1
Matthen, M. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199268509.003.0004
Representacionalismo, atención y propiedades aparentes
Pereira, F. (2021) · Revista de filosofía · doi:10.4067/s0718-43602021000100187
“Akins (1996) señala que esta perspectiva clásica incluye la idea de que nuestros sistemas sensoriales tienen tres atributos centrales.”
BackgroundInfluentialMalachowski, A. R. (2013) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139022132.020
Cunning, D. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139088220.017
How Close Are We to Understanding the Sense of Body Ownership?
Lara, L. A. M. (2022) · Eidos · doi:10.14482/eidos.37.128.6
(2022) · Eidos · doi:10.14482/eidos.37.001
‘Consciousness’ and Brain Functions: A Re-look from Functionalist Perspective
Muruganandam, S. (2022) · International Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.11648/j.ijp.20221001.11
“The sensory system of human beings serves as the mediatory to inform the brain of what is happening in the external world and within one’s body [33].”
BackgroundWorld, Mind, and Perception (The Correct View)
Fiorin, G., & Delfitto, D. (2020) · Perspectives in pragmatics, psychology & philosophy · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-46317-5_33
Matthen, M. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199268509.003.0009
Matthen, M. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199268509.003.0015
Metadata
- Authors
- Akins, K., & Journal of Philosophy Inc.
- Corresponding author
- Akins, Kathleen
- ORCID
- Akins, Kathleen
- Venue
- Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 1996
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 337-372
- ISSN
- 0022-362X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2519071442
- Cited by
- 276
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 28 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 13 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 29 · 2013: 21 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 3.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Journal of Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- sensory systems, aboutness, mental states, content of experience, qualia, philosophy of mind, perception
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