“Of Sensory Systems and the ‘Aboutness’ of Mental States”
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McKay, R. T., & Dennett, D. C. (2009) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x09990975 · Cited by 474
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“This fact becomes especially clear in cases where competitive algorithms integrate, strengthen, inhibit, and recode the various representations distributed throughout a cognitive system (Akins 1996).”
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“One might find it natural to conceptualise conscious control as a type of overt action control for which conscious states and processes are in charge.”
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“First of all, it goes against the common idea that tasting experiences are more like pain episodes or mere events (Atkins 1996): They happen somewhere but have no further spatial characteristics.”
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“First, on one plausible view of human sensory systems, which Kathleen Akins nicely characterizes as the ‘pre-ontological’ view, the most immediate deliverances of individual human sensory systems do not amount to detections of natural kinds or properties in the environment (Akins 1996).”
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“That is, interoception is not simply a matter of registering the body’s current state, but also of assessing physiological needs and capacity in relation to the organism’s present situational requirements (Akins, 1996; De Vignemont, 2018).”
Content and action: The guidance theory of representationPreprint
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“The REC proposal about PPC is consistent with ways of understanding the function of the senses in which representational contents play no part (Akins 1996).”
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“They are ‘narcissistic’ detectors in a sense not entirely unlike the sense outlined in Akins (1996).”
BackgroundBechtel, W., & Huang, L. T.-L. (2022) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108946964 · Cited by 54
“Using temperature perception as an example, Akins (1996) argues that our sensory systems do not accurately represent the world.”
de Vignemont, F. (2023) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009209717 · Cited by 57
“(Akins, 1996, p. 349) On her view, thermal sensations are not just servile detection systems that aim to be as reliable as possible in carrying information about the states with which they covary.”
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Representation and mental representation
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Seeley, W. P., & Kozbelt, A. (2008) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515080801976573 · Cited by 39
“[6] Akins (1996, pp. 337–372) makes a distinction between information carried in a signal and information encoded. Information is only encoded in a signal relative to the capacity of a system to read it. Information encoded in a signal is a subset of the information the signal carries (e.g., the light energy striking…”
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“Where the tick is permanently limited to its small, narcissistic (Akins, 1996) window on the world, human science constantly builds new and different probes, and constructs vastly differing theories by means of which to organize and cognize their deliverances.”
BackgroundFulkerson, M. (2019) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2019.1579848 · Cited by 37
“They supply an evaluative element that accounts for what Kathleen Akins [1996] called the ‘narcissism’ of sensory systems, what Mohan Matthen [2005] referred to as their ‘coercive content’—the concern with, and drives initiated towards, an organism’s comfort and well-being as opposed to their objective accuracy.”
BackgroundInfluentialVarieties of Representation in Evolved and Embodied Neural Networks
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“2 Akins (1996) advances a non-representational view of neural function. In contrast, Mandik (2002) suggests that creatures evolved nervous systems in order to represent and process information.”
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“10 Akins (1996). Akins introduces the term to describe thermal sensations.”
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“As Akins (2001) has pointed out, the outputs of thermoreceptors to not simply reflect the triggering temperatures, but also what part of the body the temperature is being applied to and what temperature was previously at that portion of the body.”
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“Our sensation of temperature, for instance, is closely related to the skin’s starting temperature; rather than detachedly reporting a change in temperature, an already hot skin will register a warm impulse as hotter and more discomforting than a cooler skin (Akins 1996).”
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“There are ways of making sense of the function of the senses in which representational contents play no part (Akins 1996).”
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“In Section 5, I argue that this pragmatic, Bnarcissistic^ (Akins 1996) character of prediction error minimization undermines its ability to explain the distinctive normativity of intentionality.”
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“Akins (2003) makes a similar argument.”
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“On this issue see also Burge (2003b, 2005, 2009), and for a related predecessor view see Kathleen Akins (1996).”
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“20 Such invariantly represented properties thus are not narcissitic properties in Akins’ (1996) sense.”
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“Akins (1996) discusses “narcissistic” biases built into sensory systems in order to optimize relevance and utility for the animal’s behavioural needs.”
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“Analogous effects are found amongst the primitive sensations of every sensory modality (e.g. touch: Akins 1996; smell: Barwich 2018).”
Perception, Representation, Realism, and Function
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Metadata
- Authors
- Akins, K., & Journal of Philosophy Inc.
- Corresponding author
- Akins, Kathleen
- ORCID
- Akins, Kathleen
- Venue
- Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 1996
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 337-372
- ISSN
- 0022-362X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2519071442
- Cited by
- 276
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 28 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 13 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 29 · 2013: 21 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 3.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Journal of Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- sensory systems, aboutness, mental states, content of experience, qualia, philosophy of mind, perception
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