The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Compatibility and Bundling of Complementary Goods in a Duopoly
Abstract
This paper presents a simple model of compatibility and bundling in industries where consumers assemble several necessary components into a system that is close to their ideal. The authors show that, for a wide range of parameters, firms will choose to produce compatible components but will offer discounts to consumers who purchase all components from the same firm. However, firms would be better off if they could commit not to provide such discounts. Furthermore, the equilibrium tends to involve socially excessive bundling. Finally, mixed bundling strategies tend to increase the range of parameters over which socially excessive standardization occurs. Copyright 1992 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Citations
Cites
Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility
Katz, M. L. (1985) · American Economic Review · Cited by 6,052
Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities
Katz, M. L., & Shapiro, C. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261409 · Cited by 2,622
Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation
Farrell, J., & Saloner, G. (1985) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555589 · Cited by 2,597
Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly
Adams, W. J., & Yellen, J. L. (1976) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1886045 · Cited by 1,542
Installed base and compatibility : innovation, product preannouncements and predation
Farrell, J., & Saloner, G. (1986) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 1,514
Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values
McAfee, R. P., McMillan, J., & Whinston, M. D. (1989) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937852 · Cited by 813
Gaussian Demand and Commodity Bundling
Schmalensee, R. (1984) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296250 · Cited by 655
"Mix and Match": Product Compatibility without Network Externalities
Matutes, C., & Regibeau, P. (1988) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555701 · Cited by 533
Self-citationConverters, Compatibility, and the Control of Interfaces
Farrell, J., & Saloner, G. (1992) · The Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.2307/2950625 · Cited by 387
Desirability of Compatibility in the Absence of Network Externalities
Economides, N. (2016) · American Economic Review · Cited by 273
Cited by
Systems Competition and Network Effects
Katz, M. L., & Shapiro, C. (1994) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.8.2.93 · Cited by 2,646
Economides, N. (1996) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-7187(96)01015-6 · Cited by 1,583
Chapter 31 Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects
Farrell, J., & Klemperer, P. (2007) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03031-7 · Cited by 1,061
Strategic Bundling of Products and Prices: A New Synthesis for Marketing
Stremersch, S., & Tellis, G. J. (2002) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1509/jmkg.66.1.55.18455 · Cited by 788
Nalebuff, B. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355304772839551 · Cited by 531
Metadata
- Authors
- Matutes, C., & Regibeau, P.
- Venue
- The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1992-03
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 37
- ISSN
- 0022-1821 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1970321809
- Cited by
- 329
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 12.78
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.