The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After
Abstract
After a critique of the traditional paradigms of regulation from the point of view of information economics, a canonical model of regulation under asymmetric information is developed. A survey of the main results obtained in the new economics of regulation is then provided, in particular concerning the implementation of optimal contracts by a menu of linear contracts, the dichotomy between pricing and cost reimbursement rules, the auctioning of incentive contracts, the dynamics of contracting under limited commitment, and the hierarchical problems in regulation. Empirical implications are then discussed and avenues of further research are described in the conclusion. Copyright 1994 by The Econometric Society.
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“The marginal cost of public funds appears prominently in applications that include optimal regulation and government procurement (Laffont and Tirole, 1993;Laffont, 1994), optimal pollution control (Bovenberg and De Mooij, 1994), optimal provision of public goods (Atkinson and Stern, 1974) and principles of cost-benefit analysis (Drèze and Stern, 1990), to name just a few.”
From Three Sides of Harberger Triangles (1998) · cites this paper as Laffont, 1994
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Self-citationAn Econometric Analysis of the Asymmetric Information, Regulator-Utility Interaction
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Cited by
Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization
Armstrong, M., & Sappington, D. E. M. (2006) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.44.2.325 · Cited by 390
Regulation and Regulatory Governance
Levi-Faur, D. (2011) · Handbook on the Politics of Regulation · doi:10.4337/9780857936110.00010 · Cited by 285
Toward a Synthesis of Models of Regulatory Policy Design with Limited Information
Armstrong, M., & Sappington, D. E. M. (2004) · Journal of Regulatory Economics · doi:10.1023/b:rege.0000028011.71612.70 · Cited by 36
Three Sides of Harberger Triangles
Hines, J. (1998) · doi:10.3386/w6852 · Cited by 28
Metadata
- Authors
- Laffont, J.-J.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1994-05
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 507
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1975340078
- Cited by
- 285
- References
- 38
- FWCI
- 25.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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